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HUMAN RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY
The international human rights system enters the 21st Century facing a profound 
anomaly.  Despite remarkable normative and institutional developments since the 
system’s inception, 1 the world remains mired in widespread violations of human dignity.
Genocidal episodes have repeatedly scared the consciousness of human kind since World 
War II.2  Floods of refugees and simmering ethnic conflicts continually challenge the 
international community’s capacity to respond3 and grotesque forms of physical abuse, 
such as torture and summary execution, remain commonplace. 4 Despite a promising 
trend toward democratic governance around the world, basic civil liberties for countless 
1
 It is beyond controversy that the international system has developed a legal regime for the protection of 
human rights once thought improbable. In addition to an extensive network of widely adopted treaties 
covering nearly all aspects human life, the international system boasts an elaborate institutional framework 
for protecting human rights. See generally Steiner and Alston, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS (Oxford, 1996).
2 See, e.g., Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 65th Session, Summary Record of the 
Second Part of the 1665th Meeting, 17 August 2004, Dialogue with Juan Mendez, Special Advisor on the 
Prevention of Genocide, CERD/C/SR.1665/Add.1, 20 August 2004 (Committee Member Shahi observing 
that “Regrettably, the United Nations itself had been ineffective in preventing genocide.  There had been at 
least 55 genocides since the Organization’s founding, in which approximately 75 million people had 
died.”).  See also http://www.genocidewatch.org/genocidetable2003.htm .  The persistence of genocidal 
episodes prompted Michael Scharf's wry observation that:     “[T]he pledge of ‘never again’ quickly 
became the reality of ‘again and again’….” Michael P. Scharf, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic: An 
Appraisal of the First International War Crimes Trial Since Nuremberg, 60 ALB. L. REV. 861, 861-62 
(1997).  
3 The most recent example involves the crisis in Darfur, Sudan.  See Report Of The International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, 25 January 2005 (available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/docs/darfurreport.doc); Report of United Nations High Commissioner For 
Human Rights, Situation Of Human Rights In The Darfur Region Of The Sudan, E/CN.4/2005/3, 7 May 
2004 (reporting a “pattern of massive and gross human rights violations”); Human Rights Watch Report:  
Darfur Destroyed, Ethnic Cleansing By Government And Militia Forces In Western Sudan, Vol. 16, no. 
6(a), May, 2004.  
4
 Amnesty International believes that as many as 150 Governments continue to practice torture.  See
http://www.amnestyusa.org/stoptorture/index.do .   Recent events at the Abu Ghraib Prison during the war 
in Iraq reflects a cold reality for Americans that torture is neither a relic of the dark past nor something 
perpetrated solely by barbaric foreign despots.  See Amnesty International Report, United States of 
America, Human Dignity Denied, Torture and Accountability in the ‘War on Terror’, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR511452004 ; Editorial, Legalizing Torture, Washington 
Post, June 9, 2004 at A20; Seymour Hearsh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, New Yorker, January 27, 2005.
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millions remain only an empty promise.5  Most disheartening of all, the two greatest 
enemies of human dignity, armed conflict and poverty, relentlessly plague the vast 
majority of human kind.6  It seems undeniable that the elaborate international human 
rights edifice, now often rhetorically central in international relations, has and can make 
some difference. Yet, it is equally undeniable that the system has yet to fulfill its 
promises or significantly reduce violations of human rights worldwide.7
The apparent inability of the human rights system to deliver effectively on its 
lofty and noble promises is not, in many ways, surprising.  It is, after-all, a system 
designed with significantly limited enforcement capacity.  Both Pollyannaish and cynical, 
the international system heavily relies upon the dubious premise that governments will 
faithfully implement international human rights standards within their own domestic 
5 See e.g., Freedom House, http://www.worldaudit.org/civillibs.htm .
6
 The “On War Project,” for example, lists over 70 events during the 1990’s that could fairly be described 
as “armed conflicts.”  See http://www.onwar.com/aced/chrono/index.htm visited February 23, 2005.  See
also Ploughshares Project, Armed Conflicts Report 2003, available at
http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/ACR/ACR00/ACR04-Introduction.html (providing descriptions of 28 
armed conflicts on-going in 2003 in which at least 1000 deaths were reported); Center for the Study of 
Civil War (Uppsala University) http://www.prio.no/cwp/ArmedConflict/ (providing a detailed database 
concerning 228 armed conflicts between 1946 – 2003). The U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization and 
World Health Organization estimate that 25,000 people die everyday from hunger and the effects of 
poverty, while nearly 1,000,000,000 people are malnourished or hungry. See
http://www.fao.org/english/newsroom/news/2002/9703-en.html . The Ploughshares Project also provides a 
map detailing the correlation between armed conflict and high percentages of under-nourished populations.  
See http://www.ploughshares.ca/imagesarticles/ACR02/hungermap.02.pdf . 
7
 There is scant empirical evidence regarding whether the international human rights system is effectively 
achieving its objectives. Oona Hathaway’s recent work is a rare example of empirically oriented legal 
research in human rights.  See Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? 111 YALE 
L. J. 1935 (2002) (examining the correlations between ratification of human rights treaties and violations); 
Oona Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821 (2003). See also L. Helfer & A. 
Slaughter, Towards a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L. J. 273, 345 (1997) 
(analyzing state compliance with the decisions of human rights institutions); Randall Peerenboom, Show 
Me The Money: The Dominance of Wealth in Determining Rights Performance in Asia, 15 DUKE J. COMP. 
& INT’L L. 75 (2004)(surveying and discussing attempts to quantify human rights performance with an 
emphasis on Asia); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring The Effects Of Human Rights Treaties, 14 
EUR J. INT’L L. 171 (2003)(critiquing the premises and design of Hathaway’s study).  Improvement in 
human rights conditions are difficult to quantify and causal relationships nearly impossible to demonstrate 
convincingly given the number and elusive nature of relevant variables.  
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systems and provide adequate domestic remedies to redress violations.8 This reliance on 
voluntary compliance is theoretically bolstered by a network of international mechanisms 
and institutions that are, in reality, anemic at best.  Although not without exceptions,9
most international human rights institutions are generally limited to monitoring state 
compliance and promoting adherence to underdeveloped international standards through 
dialogue, condemnation and moral suasion.   Most of these institutions suffer from 
limited or ambiguous decision-making authority and lack effective, independent 
enforcement mechanisms. 10
Thus constrained, the international system has generally failed to check the abuse 
of repressive governments and meaningfully deliver the promise of human rights to those 
most in need of protection.  In essence, the international system’s approach to 
enforcement and implementation of human rights has proven unrealistic in a world 
characterized by oppression, autocratic governments, poverty and armed conflict.  
Although there is no clear consensus regarding what enforcement of international human 
rights should look like, few would disagree that existing enforcement mechanisms remain 
the weakest link in the international human rights system.  
In this essay I consider some explanations for this enforcement gap and suggest 
that traditional approaches to enforcement, while serving some important functions, are 
inadequate to meet the challenge of effectively realizing human rights in the 21st Century.  
These inadequacies include a variety of institutional, conceptual and jurisprudential 
8 See infra notes 33-40, 44-45 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 115-36, 137-43 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 67-80 and accompanying text. It is important to recognize that limitations on the decision-
making authority of international institutions may serve far more important and less cynical purposes than 
preserving sovereign power.  In the context of functioning democracies, such limitations may reflect 
appropriate concessions to competing interests such as preserving domestic democratic choice, local 
autonomy and self-governance.  See generally Douglas Lee Donoho, Democratic Legitimacy in Human 
Rights: The Future of International Decision-Making, 21 WISC. INT’L L.J. 1 (2003).
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weaknesses, some of which are inherent in the system’s current design.  The most 
important of these interrelated weaknesses include: (1) failure to develop a coherent 
overall structure with institutions whose attributes are likely to promote the legitimacy of 
international decision-making and encourage state respect; (2) refusal to make important 
distinctions among rights with regard to enforcement methods; (3) failure to adequately 
pursue individual versus governmental accountability for violations; and (4) inability to 
develop adequate economic, political, and social incentives that might render voluntary 
state compliance a more realistic possibility.
Reform of existing institutions is essential and alternative approaches to 
enforcement should be developed.  It is time to rethink the approach and role of 
international institutions regarding enforcement of human rights.  Some important 
lessons, in this regard, can be drawn from several evolving alternative approaches to 
human rights enforcement and the success of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR).11   In this regard, there are three developing enforcement alternatives that are 
particularly important by virtue of their shared emphasis on individual accountability for 
a fairly narrow range of egregious, universally understood human rights violations.12 The 
first two involve the increased use of “foreign” domestic legal processes,13 both civil and 
criminal, to seek individual accountability against human rights abusers outside of their 
state of origin. These enforcement approaches might be described as the ‘Filartiga’14 and 
‘Pinochet’15 paradigms, based upon the seminal cases that exemplify them.  The third 
11 See infra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
12 Seen infra notes 88-136 and accompanying text.
13
 “Foreign” in this sense means reliance on domestic processes outside of the country in which the alleged 
violations occurred.
14
 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). See infra notes 90, 102-114 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 89, 93-101 and accompanying text. 
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enforcement alternative, of which the Pinochet paradigm is arguably also a part, is the 
international criminalization of human rights violations.16  A critical part of this trend is 
the evolution of meaningful international criminal law processes, such as those being 
developed by the International Criminal Court and ad hoc war crimes tribunals in the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.17
Although these developing alternatives are not themselves the answer to anemic 
human rights enforcement and each presents its own problems,18 their shared 
characteristics provide important reform insights.19 In particular, these alternatives 
approaches suggest an important departure from traditional institutional frameworks by 
recognizing critical distinctions among rights with regards to appropriate enforcement 
methodologies.20  Each focuses upon individual accountability.21  Each takes advantage 
of forums with clearly established decision making authority and effective enforcement 
mechanisms that are external to the violating state, yet jurisdictionally constrained.  Each 
focuses on a fairly narrow range of well-defined and egregious human rights violations.  
16 See infra notes 91, 115-36 and accompanying text
17 See infra notes 115-36 and accompanying text.
18
 Increased acceptance of alternative methodologies will, in its own right, improve human rights 
enforcement options for victims and increase the deterrence of wrongful behavior. See infra notes 144-152 
and accompanying text.  Some have argued, however, that applying domestic processes to foreign human 
rights violations poses problematic issues concerning foreign relations and the role of courts.  These might 
include the dangers of retaliation, political manipulation and disruption of foreign policy.  See, e.g., Curtis 
Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 457 (2001)(suggesting that 
these concerns are raised by international human rights litigation generally); Beth Stephens, Individuals 
Enforcing International Law: The Comparative and Historical Context, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 433 (2002) 
(summarizing and responding to such concerns).  Moreover, for a variety of reasons, it is unlikely that the 
alternatives will reach significant number of defendants. See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 152-155 and accompanying text.  
20 See infra notes 88-136, 152-53 and accompanying text.
21
 Filartiga style cases are technically not limited to individual defendants.  In the United States, for 
example, a foreign government may also be subjected to civil liability under the narrow exceptions to 
sovereign immunity authorized by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(5) and (7). 
The narrowness of this relatively recent exception and other complications in suing foreign governments 
has caused most litigation in the United States to focus on individual defendants.     
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These three characteristics sharply distinguish these enforcement alternatives from more 
traditional approaches to human rights enforcement.  
The most important of these characteristics is a focus on egregious violations of 
largely uncontested human rights standards, such as those commonly associated with jus 
cogens and universal jurisdiction.  This focus serves two related and critical purposes.  
First, it recognizes important distinctions among rights in terms of enforceability that sets 
the groundwork for desperately needed improvements in the credibility and institutional 
legitimacy of international decision-making.  As a practical matter, governments are 
more likely to create international institutions with meaningful enforcement powers if 
such powers are jurisdictionally constrained to enforce rights for which true 
international consensus exist.  
Second, appropriate distinctions among rights may also serve to preserve and 
enhance domestic democracy by reserving the resolution of controversial and genuinely 
contestable human rights issues to more accountable and democratically legitimate local 
institutions, subject to relatively weak international supervision.  Such distinctions reduce 
the potential for future, undesirable external interference in domestic democratic choice 
by international institutions that lack the credentials, accountability and authenticity to 
render democratically legitimate decision-making regarding controversial moral issues.  
Correspondingly, such prudential constraints should allow incremental improvement in 
the credibility and stature of existing international human rights institutions whose 
effectiveness is ultimately vital to achieving universal adherence to human rights 
standards.
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The persistent, historical refusal of the international system to recognize that not 
all rights should be implemented or enforced in the same ways has been a mistake.22  It 
may well be that a relatively weak system of international supervision on the global level 
is the most appropriate model for those rights involving highly contested moral issues 
because that model best supports our common interest in democratic governance and self 
determination.  In contrast, strong enforcement mechanisms, including authoritative 
international criminal law and regional processes, are both more feasible and appropriate 
for other rights over which international consensus regarding meaning is clear, such as 
torture, genocide and other egregious violations of basic human dignity.23  In essence, the 
international system must develop a more rational, nuanced and practical approach to 
human rights enforcement if it hopes to fulfill the promise of human rights in the 21st
Century.
Although an unrealistic model for international enforcement generally,24 the 
success of the ECHR provides additional, related insights regarding reform of existing 
international institutions.25  The court’s development of effective institutional 
characteristics and a carefully crafted jurisprudence defining its role vis-à-vis democratic 
member states, have been critical components of its successful enforcement record.  
Important lessons also may be drawn from the Court’s regional focus and reliance on 
independently created economic, political and cultural incentives to induce state 
compliance.  The ECHR’s success in navigating the inherent tension between 
22
 The ECHR has developed a sophisticated jurisprudence recognizing the importance of such distinctions 
as appropriate to the circumstances of Europe. See Douglas Lee Donoho, Autonomy, Self-Governance, and 
the Margin of Appreciation: Developing a Jurisprudence of Diversity Within Universal Human Rights, 15 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 391, 450-64 (2001) .
23 See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 141-43, 153-55 and accompanying text.
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international enforcement and national sovereignty has positive implications for the still 
uncertain and evolving relationship between international institutions and domestic 
democracy.  
In the following parts of this essay, I first provide an overview and critique of the 
traditional paradigms for enforcing international human rights standards.  The purpose of 
this overview is to clearly identify existing enforcement alternatives and pinpoint their 
fundamental weaknesses and limitations.   In Section II, I briefly describe the developing 
enforcement trends identified above and important characteristics of the ECHR that 
highlight lessons for reforming other existing institutions.  The remainder of the essay is 
devoted to sorting out the implications of these trends and alternatives for the future of 
human rights enforcement, with a particular emphasis on the evolving relationship 
between international human rights and domestic democracy.
II. The Prevailing Paradigm: Traditional Approaches to Human Rights Enforcement
Accurately generalizing about human rights enforcement is not a simple task.  
The international human rights system is neither unified nor static.  Over its relatively 
brief evolution, the system has generated a rather complicated structure comprised of 
numerous institutions of varied decision-making authority, enforcement capacities and 
mechanisms.26  The success of these institutions’ enforcement efforts, at least if measured 
in practical consequences, has also varied widely.  Enforcement within the highly 
functional European System of Human Rights, for example, hardly resembles that of 
26
 The international system’s complexity reflects a lack of coherent overall structure and a pressing need for 
reorganization and rationalization that has persisted for many years.  See, e.g., Douglas Lee Donoho, The 
Role of Human Rights in Global Security Issues: A Normative and Institutional Critique, 14 MICH. J. INT’L 
L. 827, 839-50, 859-64 (1993).
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other international human rights institutions, such as those promoted by the U.N. treaty 
structure or the other regional systems.  Indeed, as explained below, it is somewhat of a 
misnomer to describe the current work of many international human rights institutions as 
involving enforcement at all.27
Complicating matters, there is considerable disagreement among governments, 
scholars and the institutions themselves over the appropriate role and authority of many 
human rights bodies.  Some of these basic differences in viewpoint, prompted by 
lingering ambiguities over legal mandate,28 are reflected in the subtle linguistic 
distinctions between words such as monitoring, supervision, implementation and 
enforcement.  To monitor or supervise may, for example, imply authority to suggest 
change but not necessarily the power to bind states in any technical legal sense.  
Similarly, even when human rights institutions are given technically “binding” legal 
authority, states may refuse to create mechanisms by which to effectuate implementation 
of their decisions.  Such decisions are, in this sense, binding yet unenforceable.
The term “enforcement” is also subject to ambiguity due to the myriad forms it 
may take and the imprecise ways in which it is commonly used.29  For example, 
27 See infra notes 32, 46-51 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 67-80 and accompanying text.
29
 The dictionary definition of the word “enforce” reflects these various meanings: “1: to give force to: 
STRENGTHEN 2: to urge with energy 3: CONSTRAIN, COMPEL 4: to effect or gain by force 5: to carry 
out effectively (~laws)…” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1981).  Enforcement issues are endemic 
to the international legal order, which is characterized by institutions that generally lack direct mechanisms 
to compel compliance with their decisions.  The problems of enforcement and compliance have continued 
to generate a steady stream of sophisticated academic literature.  See, e.g., Oona Hathaway, Between Power 
and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469 (2005); Derek Jinks & 
Ryan Goodman, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L. 
J. 621 (2004); David Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, 97 NW U. L. REV. 879 
(2003); Andrew Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 (2002); 
Jose Alvarez, Why Nations Behave, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 303 (1998); Harold Koh, Why Do Nations Obey 
International Law?, 106 YALE L. J. 2599 (1997). See generally, William Bradford, International Legal 
Compliance: An Annotated Bibliography, 30 N. C. J. INT’L L. AND COM. REG. 379 (2004).
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international institutions and governments increasingly bring pressure to bear on a 
transgressing government in order to induce a change in behavior or policy through 
public condemnation.  Such pressure is often described as enforcement although it 
seldom involves mandatory sanctions, rarely induces any change in behavior and can 
usually be ignored entirely without serious consequence.30   In the discussion that 
follows, “enforcement” is generally used in the more limited sense to describe 
authoritative mechanisms that are designed and expected to compel direct consequences, 
such as changes in governmental policy, payment of civil compensation, or criminal 
penalties, under the threat of meaningful sanction.31    Enforcement is, of course, only 
one of the many ways in which state compliance and implementation of human rights 
might be induced.  As described below, enforcement in this sense forms only a small part 
of the existing international human rights regime.32
30There is no doubt that enforcement of human rights takes place in a more indirect sense on many other 
levels.  For example, it is not unreasonable to think of state-to-state posturing over human rights in 
international relations as a form of enforcement.  This is particularly true when such posturing takes place 
before international institutions that may condemn a state’s human rights performance with subtle 
consequences for that state’s economic prospects and standing in the international community.  Similarly, 
some states have linked, at least on paper, their grants of foreign aid or trade benefits to certain human 
rights standards.  See, e.g., Remark, Corporate Responsibility Within the European Union Framework, 23 
W. INT’L L. J. 541, 543-43 (2005); Hathaway, Integrated Theory, supra note 29 at 504-05.  This is 
undoubtedly enforcement on some level since such linkages are designed to induce changes in the human 
rights performance of other states. 
31
 This definition appears analogous to Hart’s position that law, by its nature, essentially requires the 
command of the sovereign, backed by meaningful sanctions compelled through the coercive power of the 
state.  See H.L.A.  Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).  However, the definition is used here solely in a 
pragmatic fashion to provide a meaningful benchmark for evaluating whether and how the international 
human rights system may generate practical consequences from legal norms.
32
 Promotional activities of international organizations, for example, potentially play an important role in 
encouraging state “internalization” of rights through national implementation of legal norms and 
empowerment of local populations.  The literature regarding state compliance with international law also 
suggests that international legal and institutional processes play a subtle role beyond coercion in developing 
compliance over time.  See generally Jinks & Goodman, supra note 29 (disputing the “premise” that 
effective international legal regimes must either coerce or persuade state actors and suggesting that regime 
design must account for complex “social” factors that influence state behavior, most prominently 
“acculturation”); Moore, supra note 29 at 882-99 (discussing human rights compliance as a form of 
“signaling” to other states regarding, among other things, readiness and capacity for diplomatic and 
economic relations).  See generally, Thomas M. Franck, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS
183-94 (1990) (concept of “legitimacy” as an explanation of the “compliance pull” of international norms). 
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It is reasonably accurate to characterize the traditional model for implementing 
international human rights as involving the interplay of domestic and international 
authority along two related paths.   The first path rests on the traditional premise that 
initial and primary authority for implementing and enforcing international standards lies 
with domestic institutions. The second path involves the participation of international 
institutions, most commonly through supervision and monitoring of state compliance.
A. Voluntary Compliance and Domestic Primacy
Under the text of most multilateral treaties, domestic institutions have primary 
and original responsibility to “give effect” to international human rights and provide an 
effective remedy for violations.33  This approach to human rights enforcement, which 
might be described as the “domestic primacy” path, emphasizes and relies upon voluntary 
government compliance.  
In this regard, it is important to recognize that international law does not require 
states to authorize direct enforcement of human rights obligations in domestic 
33
 Article 2 (2) of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, adopted by the General Assembly Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 
23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR], is illustrative.  It provides: “2. Where not already provided for by existing 
legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary 
steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to 
adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant.”  The primacy of national implementation is also reflected in the ubiquitous requirement that 
domestic remedies be exhausted as a prerequisite to invoking the jurisdiction of international human rights 
institutions.  See, e.g, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, 302-46; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 9 
I.L.M. 673 (entered into force July 18, 1978), [hereinafter American Convention] art. 46(1)(a).  See also 
Advisory Opinion OC-11/90, Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies, Arts. 46(1), 46(2)(a), 
and 46(2)(b) of the American Convention on Human Rights, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 2, 14 (Aug. 
10, 1990). See Pasqualucci, Preliminary Objections Before the Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights: Legitimate Issues and Illegitimate Tactics, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 60-61 (1999).
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institutions.34  Traditionally, states have been categorized as either “monist” or “dualist” 
in this regard, depending upon whether international obligations are automatically treated 
as operable domestic law or, rather, only incorporated into domestic law through specific 
executive or legislative action. 35  Monist states follow a “direct” or “automatic” 
incorporation approach that essentially treats international law obligations, ipso facto, as 
part of the domestic legal system enforceable like any other source of domestic law.  
Such direct incorporation would arguably reflect the pinnacle of enforceability since
international standards would be directly applied and violations remedied, at least in 
functioning democracies, by independent and effective domestic institutions. 36
So-called “dualist” states, in contrast, generally choose to implement international 
human rights obligations solely (or primarily) through legislative or executive 
intercession.  Under a dualist conception, international obligations gain the status of 
domestic law only when affirmatively incorporated into the domestic system.  Thus, for 
34
 Most international human rights treaties include an obligation to provide effective remedies for the rights 
recognized in the treaty, but do not require direct incorporation of the treaty itself. See, e.g., Human Rights 
Committee, Gen. Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on State Parties to the Covenant, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (2004).
35 See, e.g.,  Mark Janis, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ch. 4 (Aspen, 4th Ed. 2003).    See
Harold Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 52-57 (2004); Curtis Bradley, 
Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 530-31 
(1999); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion 
and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 864 (1987).
36
 The actual enforceability of an international obligation would, even under a monist approach, depend on 
additional factors.  For example, two distinct and critical issues in this regard are the precise legal status of 
the directly incorporated international obligation and, allocation of final authority over interpretation of the 
precise meaning of the obligation once incorporated.  In some states, like Germany, international law is 
treated, at least theoretically, as superior to other forms of domestic law.  See generally Janis, supra note 35 
at 85-86, 97-102, 105-09.  In the United States, an incorporated treaty (self-executing) has the 
constitutional status of federal law and therefore trumps inconsistent state law but not federal statutes 
subsequently enacted.  Id. The status of customary international law, while often debated, see note   infra, 
appears to be lower than either treaties or federal law.  See The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 708 
(1900). Direct incorporation raises yet unanswered questions regarding the authority of domestic versus 
international institutions to interpret and authoritatively apply international standards.  At least in the 
United States, it seems apparent that domestic institutions would assert ultimate authority over 
interpretation of an incorporated international obligation.  See, e.g., Brad Roth, The Enduring Significance 
Of State Sovereignty, 56 FL. L. REV. 1017, 1029-34 (2004)(asserting that “the treaty interpretations that 
prevail are those of United States courts, not international or foreign courts…”).
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example, a dualist state may selectively create domestic laws and remedies that are 
designed to protect certain internationally based rights, although the originating treaty or 
customary principle is not itself directly actionable.37  In essence, international legal 
obligations must pass through a “domestic filter” in order to become an enforceable part 
of the domestic legal order.
While useful descriptively, these distinctions fail to capture the complicated 
nuances of actual state practice, which most often appears to reflect subtle variations on 
the dualist conception.38  Although there is little empirical evidence regarding the 
prevalence of either approach to international human rights obligations, it is commonly 
thought that dualism is far more common than truly monist approaches. 39   Under these 
widespread dualist approaches to international law, the enforceability of international 
human rights obligations via domestic institutions ultimately depends on the discretionary 
37 See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
38 See Malcolm N. Shaw, INTERNATIONAL LAW 100-01, 127 (4th Ed. 1997); Henkin, supra note 35 at 865 
("Few if any nations are either strictly monist or strictly dualist."); Janet Koven Levit, The 
Constitutionalization of Human Rights in Argentina: Problem or Promise?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSN’L L. 
281, 293-309 (1999)(reviewing incorporation practices of various Latin American states). The U.S. legal 
system is an excellent example of these nuances.  At least nominally, the United States Constitution 
appears to create a monist approach.  See U.S. Const. art. VI, §1, cl. 2; The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 
700 (1900).  In reality, however, United States law reflects a hybrid of monist and dualist characteristics by 
virtue of the judicially created doctrine of self-executing treaties and our sometimes ambiguous treatment 
of international customary law.  “Self-executing” treaties may be directly incorporated into the domestic 
legal system and actionable without prior legislative authorization. However, no significant international 
human rights treaty has ever been held self-executing in the United States.  This is due, at least in part, to 
the Senate’s consistent practice of attaching a declaration of non-self-execution to such treaties. See Curtis 
Bradley, International Delegations, The Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Executing Treaty, 55 STAN. 
L. REV. 1557 (2003); Lori Fischer Damrosch, the Role of the United States Senate Concerning “Self-
Executing” and “Non-Self-Executing” Treaties, 67 CHI-KENT L. REV. 515, 515 (1991). Customary law, in 
contrast, is generally treated as an actionable part of the domestic legal system, but with a status below that 
of most other forms of domestic law.  See Paquette Habana, supra; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d 
Cir. 1980); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).  The precise legal status of customary law, 
particularly whether its violation is actionable in the federal courts, is still subject to intense debate.  See 
generally Ehren Brav, Recent Developments, Opening The Courtroom Doors To Non-Citizens: Cautiously 
Affirming Filartiga For The Alien Tort Statute, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 265 (2005)(summarizing the debate 
over the status on customary international law and the implications of the Sosa decision). See infra notes    
and accompanying text
39 See Janis, supra note 35 at 85-86, 97-102, 105-08.
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actions of national authorities. Thus, effective domestic implementation essentially rests 
upon the voluntary, discretionary actions of each government.40
B. The Traditional Role of International Institutions
Most international human rights institutions have, at minimum, responsibility to 
“monitor” or “supervise” the presumed national implementation of international 
obligations by state parties.  In this sense, the traditional model for effectuating 
international rights necessarily also implicates international authority.  Thus, a second 
major path of human rights enforcement involves the work of international human rights 
institutions and the response of domestic legal systems to that work product.  The critical 
considerations in this regard involve the authority of international institutions and 
mechanisms for enforcement.    
Theoretically, the international side of rights enforcement could take place under 
a vertical or “top-down” model in which authoritative international human rights 
institutions would directly compel compliance with human rights standards, utilizing 
means ranging from an “international marshal’s office” to binding economic sanctions.41
As currently situated, however, international human rights institutions do not enjoy the 
40
 One might presume that states ratify human rights treaties with a commitment to voluntarily comply with 
their provisions for the good of their people.  More cynical explanations for state ratification of treaties are, 
sadly, more plausible.  Many states undoubtedly join human rights treaties precisely because they expect 
few consequences from doing so. How else can one explain widespread adoption of human rights treaties 
among the world’s most egregious violators? 
41
 Arguments favoring “linkages” between human rights compliance and participation in international 
economic institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO are creative extensions of this basic idea.  
See generally, David Leebron, 2002 Symposium: The Boundaries of the WTO : Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 5 (2002); Jagdish Bhagwati, Symposium: The Boundaries of the WTO, Afterword: The Question of 
Linkage, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 126, 132 (2002); Frank Garcia, 1998 Symposium: Trade and Justice: Linking 
the Trade Linkage Debate, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 391 (1998).
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capacity to directly enforce their own decisions.42  Lacking their own enforcement 
powers and mechanisms, these institutions must instead rely on the domestic enforcement 
capacities and good will of domestic governments.  
Because of this, the theoretical apex of enforceability for international institutions 
would occur if and when states recognized international decisions as authoritative and 
binding, and allowed the direct enforcement of such decisions by domestic institutions.  
In essence, states could choose to give the decisional output of human rights institutions 
“direct effect”43 without requiring prior legislative or executive action or approval.  The 
reality is, however, that international law does not require that states adopt this approach 
to international decision-making and few, if any, states appear to have done so.44  For the 
vast majority of the international community, the decisions of international human rights 
institutions are simply not treated as binding or authoritative within the domestic legal 
order, even if technically “binding” under the relevant treaty regime.45
42
 Even international criminal law institutions such as the ICTY and the ICC are generally forced to rely on 
the existing institutional enforcement mechanisms of member states.  The ICTY may indict, issue arrest 
warrants, prosecute and sentence perpetrators of crimes against humanity, and has the imprimatur and 
authority of the United Nations Security Council.  Yet, it has no means of directly effectuating any of these 
powers.  Rather, the ICTY relies on enforcement capacity of member states that agree to carry out its orders 
and ultimately even punish those convicted. See United Nations, Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, Overview, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/general/overview.htm  ;William A. Schabas, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 176 (2001).
43
 Recognition of the decisions of international institutions presents distinct issues from the question of 
incorporation of international obligations generally.  See note 36 supra.
44 See generally Jenny S. Martinez, Towards An International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 491-
95 (2003). There are, of course, exceptions such as Costa Rica.  See H. Jarmul, The Effect Of Decisions Of 
Regional Human Rights Tribunals On National Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 311, 317-18 (1997) 
citing Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission 16, 26 OEA ser.L/III.6, doc. 13 rev. 
(1982)(legislation ratified by the Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica on September 9, 1983, Law No. 
6889).  Even within the highly effective European system, both the European Court of Justice of the 
European Union and the ECHR primarily rely on the willingness of member states to voluntarily comply 
with and enforce their judgments.   See Slaughter & Helfer, Supranational Adjudication, supra note 7 at 
297.
45
 A good example of this is the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.  See note    infra.  Although the 
Court’s decisions under the American Convention’s individual petitioning process are technically binding 
on the state defendant, See Constitutional Court (Peru), Provisional Measures, Order of Aug. 14, 2000, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), P 14 (2000), States have often simply ignored the Court, inevitably without 
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Ultimately, most governments choose to enforce international decisions, if at all, 
solely through discretionary domestic legislative or executive action.  Governments have 
generally reserved to themselves final discretion regarding the actual manner and method 
for enforcement of international institution decisions, if they enforce them at all.  The key 
element to effective enforcement once again lies with each government’s discretionary 
voluntary compliance, in this instance whether to treat the output of international human 
rights bodies as authoritative and translate those decisions into action.   
It is fair to say that the traditional model for human rights enforcement involves a 
rather murky convergence between the two enforcement paths described above.  
International human rights treaties generally place primary responsibility for 
implementation and enforcement in the hands of national authorities subject to typically 
ambiguous international supervisory powers.  International institutions monitor state 
compliance and may offer alternative forms of redress when the national system fails. 
These international processes are not generally authoritative, however, and even when 
technically binding lack clear enforcement mechanisms. The effectiveness of 
international remedies is, in turn, almost always dependent on the subject government’s 
willingness to voluntarily comply. Since international institutions lack both authority and 
independent enforcement capacities, actual enforcement of international remedies 
serious consequences. See, e.g., H. Jarmul, supra note 44 at 317-18.  See also Lawrence Helfer, 
Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash 
Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1870-94 (2002) (discussing the withdrawal 
from HRC's jurisdiction by three Caribbean nations after adverse rulings). In contrast, virtually all parties 
to the European Convention on Human Rights have acknowledged the binding nature of the ECHR’s 
decisions.  See Slaughter & Helfer, Supranational Adjudication, supra note 7 at 276, 295-97. National 
courts may, of course, sometimes choose to follow the decisions of international tribunals as persuasive 
authority.  See Martinez, supra note 44 at 491-95 (describing the occasional persuasive influence of 
international decision making on national courts, including the controversial influence of international and 
foreign law on the U.S. Supreme Court). 
Donoho Final Draft 4-19-06
17
ultimately depends upon the willingness of the perpetrators to meaningfully implement 
rights and comply with international supervisory authority.
C.  Institutional Failures and Ambiguous Authority
It is important to recognize initially that much of the work product of the current 
international human rights system is not designed for enforcement, at least in the sense 
described above.  Rather, existing institutions are designed primarily to promote human 
rights through disclosure, dialogue and technical assistance.  For example, the United 
Nations Charter based system, which primarily involves the politically dominated work 
of the Commission on Human Rights and its various subsidiary organizations,46 does not 
seek to enforce human rights in any direct manner.47  Institutions created under the U.N. 
sponsored network of multilateral human rights treaties are also primarily involved in 
work better described as promotion rather than enforcement.  Each of the seven major 
multilateral human rights treaties sponsored by the U.N. creates a “committee” of experts 
46 See generally, Weissbrodt, Fitzpatrick & Newman, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY AND 
PROCESS, Ch.6 (3rd Ed., 2001).  Commonly referred to in Western press as “discredited,” the Commission 
was replaced on March 27, 2006, by a reformed “Human Rights Council.” See
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infocusID=114&Body=human%20rights%20council&Bod
y1=  .  The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights has become increasingly important as a 
spokesperson and promoter of human rights and often provides a rapid response to developing human 
rights crises.  The Commissioner’s office has also organized and provided a more visible and centralized 
face to the U.N.’s important human rights activities. Thus far, however, the High Commissioner serves no 
direct enforcement role and has no overt authority in that regard. 
47 With some minor exceptions, these U.N. “Charter-based” institutions essentially provide for a forum for 
public condemnation of friendless states guilty of a “consistent pattern of gross violations.” With no 
authority to provide individual redress and no history of pursuing organized consequences for violating 
states, the work of these U.N. Charter-based institutions simply doesn’t involve enforcement in any 
meaningful sense, even though the CHR has the authority to refer matters to the U.N. Security Council. 
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who primarily serve fact finding and promotional roles, reviewing state periodic reports 
on implementation and issuing “general comments.”48
Although there has been some effort to assert authority to bind states pursuant to 
the general comments,49 it would be a misnomer to refer to such work as “enforcement,” 
at least in the sense described above.50  The promotional activity of human rights 
institutions focuses almost exclusively on encouraging states to voluntarily change their 
behavior through dialogue, confrontation and exposure regarding alleged violations of 
international standards.   This activity has important benefits but cannot, at least in the 
short term, be relied upon as a meaningful way to compel compliance with rights where 
needed most.51
Enforcement is probably more apropos and relevant to the various individual 
petitioning processes created by the regional systems and four of the major multilateral 
treaties.52  Each of the three regional human rights systems – the Inter- American, 
48 See generally Donoho, Institutional Critique, supra note 26 at 859-862 (1993); Alston & Steiner, supra
note 1.
49
 The Human Rights Committee appears to believe that General Comments issued by the Committee are 
authoritative and binding on the state parties. See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, General Comment 24 
(52), General Comment On Issues Relating To Reservations Made Upon Ratification Or Accession To The
Covenant Of The Optional Protocols Thereto, Or In Relation To Declarations Under Article 41 Of The 
Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994). 
50 See supra note  and accompanying text.  In some instances, the line between enforcement and 
“monitoring” is somewhat blurry.  For example, the Commission on Human Rights has, since 1985, 
appointed a “Special Rapporteur on Torture” who has the authority to not only conduct fact-finding but 
also release “urgent appeals” to governments regarding the treatment of specific individuals at risk of 
torture.  See http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/torture/rapporteur/ .  
51 See supra note 32, infra note 154-55  and accompanying text.  
52
 There are currently seven major treaty-based monitoring institutions operating under the United Nations 
system.  Each of these “committees” is entrusted with monitoring state compliance with the rights 
recognized in their respective treaty texts.  These seven major treaties comprehensively cover civil and 
political rights (ICCPR, supra note 33), economic and social rights (International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, (entered into force Jan 3, 1976), [hereinafter ICESCR]), racial 
discrimination (International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. 
Res. 2106A (xx), 20 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. I) 47, UN Doc. A/6014, 21 Dec. 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 
(entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter CERD]), gender discrimination (Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, GA Res. 34/180, 34 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 
46) at 193, UN Doc. A/34/46 (1979), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]), torture (Convention 
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European and African – administer individual petitioning processes under which human 
rights victims may bring their complaints, after exhaustion of domestic remedies, before a 
judicial or quasi-judicial body for resolution. 53  ICCPR, CAT, CERD and CEDAW 
create similar processes that apply to any state that has voluntarily agreed to the relevant 
committee’s petitioning jurisdiction.54
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 46, U.N. 
GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/Res/39/46 (1984)[hereinafter CAT]) ; children’s 
rights (Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 25, U.N. GAOR 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. 
doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989) [hereinafter Children’s Convention]; and the rights of migrant workers, 
(Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, GA 
Res. 45/158 (1990).  
53
 The three regional systems are each designed to promote adherence to comprehensive regional human 
rights treaties covering a wide variety of human rights concerns. Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,  213 U.N.T.S. 221, as amended by Protocol 11, Nov. 1, 1998, 
(European Convention); American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, arts. 61, 63, 68, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123; Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, art. 24, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986). See generally GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE, (3rd Edition, H. Hannum, ed. 1999) at Chs. 7-9. The OAS has empowered the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which must be distinguished from the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, to serve monitoring functions under the OAS Charter and the American 
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man. The Commission also serves a quasi-judicial function, along 
with the Inter-American Court, under the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights.  See Cecilia 
Medina, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights: Reflections on a Joint Venture, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 439 (1990); V. Rodriguez & M. Seitles, The 
Development of the Inter-American Human Rights System: A Historical Perspective and A Modern-Day 
Critique, 16 N.Y.L.S. J. H. RTS 593 (2000).  In 1998, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted a 
Protocol to the African Charter which established an African Court on Human Rights to complement the 
work of the pre-existing African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. The court is not yet 
operational and may be merged with the African Court of Justice.  See Curry, Cevra & Palmer, Updates 
From the Regional Human Rights Systems, 12 HUM. RTS BRIEF 23 (2005); Protocol to the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, 
OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III), art. 27(2) (June 9, 1998). Each provides, with variations, 
a petitioning process that allows individuals to seek redress for alleged violations of the relevant treaty by 
their government.  For a general description of these various processes generally Alston & Steiner, supra
note 1.
54
 Apart from the American Convention, each relevant treaty authorizes the petitioning process only for 
those state parties that specially consent.  See e.g., Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,(302-46);  CERD, supra note 52 at art. 14; CAT, supra note 52 at 
art. 22.  Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women , U.N. Doc. A/Res/54/4 (1999).  As of March, 2006, 78 states had become parties to the Protocol.  
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/text.htm . By March, 2006, the Committee had 
rendered views concerning 3 communications.  See 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/dec-views.htm .  The Committee on Migrant Workers 
(CMW), which held its first session in 2004, will have competence to hear individual complaints once 10 
state parties declare themselves subject to the process authorized in Article 77 of the Convention.  See
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/index.htm .
A draft optional protocol that would create an individual communications process under the ESCRC is now 
under consideration by a special working group of the CHR.  See
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There are, of course, variations in the precise operation of these various 
petitioning systems.  In general, however, each essentially provides an international 
forum before which individuals, from those states that have specially consented, may 
allege that the government has violated treaty based human rights standards.  In each 
system, those states consenting to the process have authorized international decision 
makers to examine such allegations and, at minimum, present their views as to whether 
the government has complied with the relevant international agreement.  As described 
below, the most critical question regarding these petitioning processes lies in the 
authoritativeness and enforceability of the various institutions’ decisions.  
The European system, under the leadership of the ECHR, has undoubtedly the 
most impressive enforcement record of these various individual petitioning systems.55
Consent to the ECHR’s jurisdiction is mandatory for all 41 members of the European 
Convention and the Council of Europe.56  Although not without exceptions, the decisions 
of the ECHR are generally respected and implemented by the state parties of the 
European Convention.57  In some senses, the European system provides evidence 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/index.htm .  Parties to the American Convention subject 
themselves to the Convention’s individual petitioning process before the Inter-American Commission by 
virtue of joining the treaty.  American Convention, supra note 33 at Art. 44. They may also, in their 
discretion, subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court, which reviews decisions 
made by the Commission regarding individual petitions.  See id at Art. 62.
55 See generally Andrew Drzemczewski and Meyer-LeDwig, Principle Characteristics of the New ECHR 
Control Mechanism, As Established by Protocol 11, 15 AM. RTS. L.J. 81, 82 (1994); Slaughter & Helfer, 
Supranational Adjudication, supra note 7 at  282-337.
56
 European Convention, as amended by Protocol 11, Art. 34, supra note 53.
57 See infra  notes 137-43 and accompanying text. Most commentators, and the ECHR itself, see Effects of 
Judgments or Cases, http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/edocs/effectsof judgments.html ,  suggest that there is a 
very high rate of state compliance with the Court’s decisions. See, e.g., Slaughter & Helfer, Supranational 
Adjudication, supra note 7 at 276, 296.  Professors Yoo and Posner, however, suggest that there is 
insufficient empirical data to support such assertions regarding compliance with ECHR decisions.  See
Posner & Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1, 64-66 (2005). But see
Helfer & Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 
93 CAL. L. REV. 899 (2005) (challenging Posner & Yoo on methodology and conclusions).
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regarding how traditional approaches to human rights enforcement might work under the 
right circumstances.58
The ECHR’s success in securing compliance, while not unblemished,59 stands in 
sharp contrast to the record of other international petitioning systems.  The Inter-
American system, for example, has had limited success in enforcing the decisions of its 
Commission and Court, even though those decisions are also technically “binding” under 
the American Convention on Human Rights.60  The enforcement record regarding 
decisions of the treaty-based bodies, such as the Human Rights Committee, is even more 
disappointing.61
There are undoubtedly many reasons why it has proven difficult to enforce the 
adjudicatory decisions of international human rights institutions outside the context of 
Europe.  Most significantly, however, states have found it easy to ignore such decisions 
as the result of three related factors: (1) ambiguous mandates and limited legal authority; 
(2) lack meaningful legal or practical incentives to induce state compliance; and (3) 
insufficient institutional legitimacy to induce voluntary compliance.62
Governments have not found it particularly painful to ignore the views and 
recommendations of most international human rights institutions because there are few, if 
any, serious consequences associated with doing so.  Most governments comply with 
58 See infra notes 137-43, 139-41 and accompanying text.
59 See Christian Tomuschat, Quo Vadis Argentoratum?  The Success of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and a Few Dark Stains, 13 HUM. RTS. L.J. 401 (1992) (discussing problems with delay, 
implementation and enforcement); Paul Mahoney, New Challenges for the European Court of Human 
Rights Resulting From the Expanding Case Load and Membership, 21 Penn. St. Int’l L. Rev. 101, 101-102 
(2002) (continuing problems with caseload and delay). 
60 See, e.g., H. Jarmul, supra note 44 at 317-18 (1997); Kimberly King-Hopkins, Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights: Is Its Bark Worse Than Its Bite in Resolving Human Rights Disputes? 35 
TULSA L. J. 421, 432-43 (2000).
61
 Indeed, given the ambiguous legal status of such decisions and the absence of independent international 
enforcement mechanisms, it is perhaps more accurate to describe the lack of compliance with HCR 
decisions as a lack of voluntary compliance rather than a failure of enforcement.
62 See infra notes 67-80 and accompanying text.
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such decisions only when it is politically expedient to do so.63  Lacking mechanisms that 
compel compliance through sanction or other meaningful practical incentives, 
enforcement of international decisions depends entirely on the political goodwill of the 
government concerned.  Given that the government is, by definition, the perpetrator of 
the alleged violation; it is hardly surprising that compliance is the exception, especially in 
states ruled by oppressive regimes.  There is, in this sense, an inherent contradiction built 
into the system’s approach to enforcement, which leaves compliance largely within the 
discretion of the perpetrators.  
Reliance on voluntary compliance does not, of course, doom the human rights 
system to failure.  Indeed, voluntary compliance with the decisions of respected 
international institutions should, ideally, have a central role in a rationally designed 
international enforcement regime.64  Even in functioning domestic legal systems, it is 
primarily respect for the authority of the institution that ultimately renders judicial 
decisions readily enforceable, not any inherent power wielded by the court itself.65
Voluntary compliance has also been essential to the success of the European system.66
63
 Australia’s compliance with the HRC’s controversial Toonen decision is a good example of this.  
Tasmania stood alone among Australian states in its outdated condemnation of consensual homosexual 
conduct and the Australian federal government was in full agreement with the HRC on the merits. See
Steiner & Alston, supra note 1 at 740.  Other countries such as Canada and Finland, however, have 
frequently chosen to comply with HRC decisions with which they disagreed.  These successes demonstrate 
again that compliance depends upon the political good will of the state, leaving enforcement least likely 
where it is needed most. 
64 See infra notes 154 and accompanying text.
65
 President Andrew Jackson’s alleged response to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), which would have potentially conflicted with a federal 
policy of forcibly removing Native Americans from their ancestral lands, highlights this point.  Faced with 
the prospect of using federal authority to enforce the decision against state officials, Jackson is alleged to 
have said: “Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it.” See Encyclopedia Britannica On Line, 
available at http://www.britannica.com/presidents/article-9116896
66
 In Europe, the failure to comply with the decisions of the ECHR may lead to action by the Council of 
Europe but the ECHR itself has no direct enforcement powers.  Under Article 46 of the Convention 
member states pledge to “abide by” the Court’s judgments.  The Committee of Ministers, the central 
decision making body in the Council of Europe, has the authority to “supervise” compliance.  It serves this 
function in a systematic fashion by placing judgments on the public agenda of its regular meetings and 
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Although it operates under sui generis circumstances, the European system relies heavily 
on national enforcement and voluntary government compliance with the decisions of the 
ECHR.  In this regard, the European system appears to thrive by virtue of a happy 
coincidence of mutually reinforcing incentives and the respect that the ECHR has earned 
over time.  Similarly, a critical reason for the dearth of voluntary compliance outside 
Europe undoubtedly lays in the fundamental lack of respect that states exhibit toward the 
authority of most other existing human rights institutions and the paucity of incentives to 
induce such respect and compliance.  
This apparent lack of respect for the authority of international human rights 
institutions is undoubtedly related to ambiguity regarding their legal mandate67 and 
doubts over the legitimacy of “external” international decision-making regarding 
domestic practices.68  The problem in this sense is two-fold.  On the one hand, most 
international institutions have ambiguous or ill-defined legal authority that potentially 
could be interpreted as including authoritative jurisdiction over an extremely wide-range 
inviting the member state to report on compliance.  See Committee of Ministers Web Site on Execution of 
Judgments,  http://www.coe.int/T/E/Human_Rights/execution/ See also Committee Rules on Application 
of Article 46 (2)(Enforcement of Judgments), 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=736/4.2&Sector=secCM&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=appendix5&B
ackColorInternet=9999CC&BackColorIntranet=FFBB55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75
On a practical level, effective enforcement also depends upon each state’s approach to incorporation of 
treaty obligations and the decisions of international bodies, with national courts playing a prominent role.  
See, e.g., John Cary Sims, Compliance Without Remands; The Experience Under The European 
Convention on Human Rights, 36 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 639, 643-44 (2004).  There are many political, economic 
and cultural incentives within the European system that promote what is essentially voluntary compliance.  
See e.g., Scott Stephans, Self-Enforcing International Agreements and the Limits of Coercion, 2004 WISC. 
L. REV. 551, 605-611 (2004) (discussing how human rights norms in Europe are “embedded” within a 
network of mutually beneficial reciprocal state interests).  See also Yoo & Posner, Judicial Independence, 
supra note   at 64-66. These circumstances clearly distinguish the European system from other international 
human rights institutions.  See infra note 139-41 and accompanying text.
67 See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.  Unresolved ambiguities over authority have plagued 
international institutions from their inception.  In many ways, the lack of human rights enforcement has 
been defined by the persistent unresolved tension between international and domestic authority regarding 
the status of international institutions, human rights treaties and international law itself.  Most human rights 
treaties reflect this unresolved tension by leaving the respective roles of international and domestic 
institutions ill defined and ambiguous. 
68 See Donoho, Democratic Legitimacy, supra note 10 at 50-51.
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of human rights issues including those with highly debatable or controversial substantive 
content.  At the same time, these institutions lack the attributes of institutional legitimacy 
that might engender widespread state trust and respect.  Virtually all of these international 
institutions, outside of Europe, suffer from politicized appointment processes, lack of 
financial resources, poorly defined legal authority, failure to utilize full-time professional 
judges and flawed fact finding processes. 69  These international decision makers are 
generally unaccountable in the most literal sense, and render decisions that are, by 
definition, external to the body politic where the alleged violations occurred.  
More significantly, these institutions have also failed to carefully and 
incrementally develop their own legitimacy and credibility over time in light of practical 
limitations on their powers and capacities.70  They have, in essence, failed to evolve an 
appropriate and realistic relationship vis-à-vis domestic authority and democratic 
institutions.  The circumstances of the Human Rights Committee (HRC), created by the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), are representative.  
On the one hand, the substantive scope of human rights issues covered by the 
ICCPR is enormous, including both rights over which little legitimate dispute is possible 
(torture) as well as those raising morally charged issues that are highly contested in 
domestic societies (privacy, free speech, gay marriage).  At the same time, the HRC’s 
69 See Donoho, Democratic Legitimacy, supra note 10 at 36, 51-52; Donoho, Institutional Critique, supra
note 26 at 854-68.
70 One might, in this regard, contrast the historically incremental development of the ECHR’s authority 
with the recent controversial assertions of authority (whether legally justified or not) by the HRC.  
Compare H. Yourow, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN 
RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 196 (1996) (reviewing the incremental growth in the ECHR’s legitimacy and 
authority) with L. Helfer, Backlash, supra note 45 (describing the controversy over decisions by the HRC 
regarding application of the death penalty among Caribbean states).  See also Helfer & Slaughter, 
Supranational Adjudication, supra note 7, at 315-17, 355-56, 367, 336-68 (also providing a general 
overview of similarities and contrasts between the characteristics and circumstances of the HRC and the 
ECHR); Makau wa Mutua, Looking Past the Human Rights Committee: An Argument for De-
MarginalizingEnforcement, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211, 214-37, 252-60 (1998).
Donoho Final Draft 4-19-06
25
authority over this potentially wide range of issues is poorly defined.  Article Two of the 
ICCPR endorses the primacy of national implementation and enforcement of rights, 
suggesting that domestic institutions have primary authority to implement and remedy 
rights recognized in the covenant.71  Yet, the Committee is required in its consideration of 
state periodic reports and in “general comments” to monitor state compliance with the 
treaty and provide guidance to the parties. Similarly, under the individual petitioning 
process created by the ICCPR’s Optional Protocol, the HRC is called upon to render its 
“views” and recommend appropriate remedies for violations.72  Thus, while the HRC has 
no explicit authority to render binding interpretations of the covenant itself,73 its 
functions obviously require some implicit authority to interpret the meaning of rights.  
What role is the HRC to have?  Here reasonable differences of opinion are 
possible if not encouraged by the treaty.  The Committee itself has essentially taken the 
position that states are bound by their treaty obligations to implement the Committee’s 
decisions.74  However reasonable this position may be, it has only minimal textual 
support and there is no evidence that the Committee’s decisions are treated as 
71
 CCPR, supra note 33 at Art. 2.
72 See Optional Protocol, supra note 33 at Art. 5(4) (“receive and consider” communications from 
individuals and “forward its views to the State Party concerned and to the individual.”)
73
 Neither of the two general powers given to the HRC, to review state periodic reports and issue general 
comments, include textual support for authoritative supervisory powers. CCPR, supra note 33 at Art. 
40(“study” periodic reports of state parties and “transmit its reports and such general comments as it may 
consider appropriate” to the parties).  See also Mutua, Looking Past, supra note 70 at 235-39.  
74
 In 1994, the HRC declared in General Comment 24(52) that it had the authority to determine the validity 
of state reservations.  See William Schabas, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 3 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & LAW 79, 90-95, 109 (1997); Robert Rosenstock, Current Development: The Forty-Ninth Session 
of the International Law Commission, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 107, 110 (1998). More controversial, the HRC 
also announced that reservations found invalid, such as the U.S. reservations on the death penalty, were 
legally "severable" such that the reserving state was a full party to the treaty as if no reservation had been 
entered.  Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 24, Nov. 2, 1994, para. 18, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev./Add.6. More recently, the HRC has declared that Canada violated the ICCPR by 
refusing, pursuant to an HRC interim measure, to stay the deportation of a man seeking review before the 
HRC.  Ahani v. Canada, U.N. Human Rights Comm., 80th Sess., para. 1.2, 5.3, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/80/D/1051/2002 (2004) (available at http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/UNHRC/2004/20.html).
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authoritative within the domestic systems of the various state parties.75  Indeed, it seems 
probable that many state parties never intended to create such authority and some major 
governments, including the United States, have expressly disavowed its existence.76
Moreover, the HRC is sorely lacking in institutional attributes that might enhance 
its legitimacy and engender state respect for its authority.  The 18 part-time “experts” 
who serve on the committee come from diverse backgrounds and cultures.77  The process 
for selecting such experts is largely political with virtually no democratic domestic 
involvement.78 The committee has no real fact finding processes, no appellate review 
process and virtually no oversight.79 Under these circumstances, it is simply not 
surprising that governments have been slow in legitimizing the HRC’s work product and 
75
 The judgments of the H.R.C. under the individual petitioning system, for example, are not generally 
thought to be enforceable in the domestic courts of state parties.  See e.g., Ahani v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), 
[2002] 58 O.R.3d 107, 108, 117-21 (Canada not bound to stay deportation proceedings based on the views 
of the HRC). Perhaps more significantly, States have tended to ignore the recommendations of treaty-based 
monitoring bodies. See Report of the Human Rights Committee 2002, Vol 1, para. 95, UN Doc. A/57/40 
(2002) para. 225 (estimating only 30% compliance); Report of the Human Rights Committee 2004, Vol I, 
para. 256 (2004)(noting trend of non-compliance and expressing “deep concern” over the “increasing 
number of cases where states parties fail to implement” Committee’s final views on individual petitions).  
See also Dana D. Fischer, International Reporting Procedures, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS PRACTICE 188 (Hurst Hannum ed., 1994). 
76 See Government Responses, Observations on General Comment No. 24 (52), on Issues Relating to 
Reservations Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols Thereto, or in 
Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, United States of America, CCPR 
A/50/40/Vol.1, Annex VI (1995) (HRC has no power to issue binding interpretations). See also Sylvia 
Brown Hamano, Incomplete Revolutions and Not So Alien Transplants: The Japanese Constitution and 
Human Rights, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 415, 469-70, n. 253 (1999)(suggesting that Japanese courts have 
generally accepted government arguments that Japan is not bound by HRC interpretations of the ICCPR); 
L. Helfer, Backlash, supra note 45 at 1870-1882 (describing the refusal of some Caribbean states to comply 
with decisions of the HRC regarding capital punishment and eventual renunciations of the ICCPR itself).
77 See Web Site of the Human Rights Committee, http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/members.htm
Geographic diversity is ensured by the requirement that experts are selected in accordance with the usual 
UN regional groupings. Id.
78 See Donoho, Democratic Legitimacy, supra note 10 at 17-18, 32-33, 32 n. 101, 36-37, 36 n. 110.  See
also Anne Bayefsky, Direct Petition in the UN Human Rights Treaty System, 95 ASIL PROC. 71, 74 
(2001)(asserting that 50% of the 950 experts sitting on the four UN Treaty institutions with petitioning 
mechanisms over a 20 year period had full time jobs with their home government).
79
 Most cases before the HRC do not turn on factual disputes but rather involve legal disputes regarding 
consistency of government action with the treaty.  Nevertheless, individual petitions are considered solely 
based on documentation provided by the petitioner and responding state, leaving little room for accurate 
resolution of factual conflict.  
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reluctant to concede its authority. The circumstances of the HRC are typical of 
international human rights institutions.  Outside of the context of Europe, the status and 
legal authority of international decision-making in human rights is ambiguous at best and 
international human rights forums typically lack important institutional attributes that 
might boost their legitimacy.
The ambiguous authority and weak institutional characteristics of international 
human rights institutions itself reflects the deeper underlying causes of their current 
ineffectiveness.  Useful contrasts may be drawn between the European system and the 
other human rights institutions. The European Court of Human Rights has been 
successful not just because it enjoys clear mandates and strong institutional attributes, or 
because of its intelligent decision-making.  Rather, the Court also owes its success to the 
generally favorable political conditions within the member states, cultural and social 
affinities, rational jurisprudential limits on its authority and the political and economic 
incentives that are associated with compliance and membership in the system. 80 None of 
these factors are present in the larger more diverse international community and are not 
likely to develop in the near future.  
D.  Distinctions Among Rights, Institutional Legitimacy and Practical Incentives
There is, in a certain sense, a degree of incoherence built into the international 
system’s general approach to enforcement.  This incoherence implicates the very 
80 See Donoho, Relativism Versus Universalism in Human Rights: The Search for Meaningful Standards, 
27 STAN. J. INT’L L. 345, 463-65 (1991).  Cf., Posner & Yoo, Judicial Independence in International 
Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1, 61–62 (2005) (characterizing the “institutional setting” of the European 
Court of Justice as more like a “domestic court” because of the “bonds” created by the European Union).
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rationale for developing an international system of human rights in the first place. 
Lacking democratic safeguards, oppressive regimes face few domestic constraints on 
their treatment of people.  The international human rights system seeks to create 
constraints in the form of international institutions and rules that might limit or temper 
government abuse of people.  The internationalization of rights is, in essence, the search 
for higher authority to constrain the repressive power of abusive governments. 81
Yet, no such higher authority currently exists.82  The international legal system is 
generally still deeply committed to state sovereignty, and legal obligations depend almost 
exclusively upon state consent.83  Nor is the development of such authority in human 
rights institutions likely in the foreseeable future.  Outside of the relatively cohesive 
regional context of Europe, there are currently few incentives to create and adhere to 
broad grants of unambiguous international authority over human rights.84
Governments, whether progressive and enlightened, or oppressive and corrupt, 
naturally resist the idea of binding authoritative decision-making by “external” 
international institutions, particularly independent ones -- at least with regard to their own 
actions.  Within functioning constitutional democracies that generally respect basic 
81
 There are of course other important motivations for maintaining the international system of rights, such 
as the progressive improvement in social and economic conditions. Such goals, however, don’t imply or 
require authoritative legal status for international institutions.  
82
 One could certainly argue reasonably that the ECHR is an example of such higher authority and its 
potential for human rights enforcement.  However reasonable this viewpoint, it is equally clear that Europe 
and the ECHR are in many significant ways, sui generis.  See infra notes 139-41and accompanying text.
83
 It has become almost cliché to assert that traditional notions of sovereignty have changed significantly 
over the last 50 years.  Extravagant claims about the demise of sovereignty, however, seem exaggerated 
when one considers actual state practice.  International obligations still ultimately rest on state consent that 
can be withdrawn or altered within each state’s discretion.  And, even in the context of highly developed 
international legal regimes such as the GATT 94, states have surrendered sovereignty only cautiously and 
provisionally, retaining discretion whether to bear the economic consequences of non-compliance with 
international dispute settlement and decision-making processes. What can be said is that absolute state 
sovereignty, to the extent that it ever actually existed, has been eroded in the sense that there is increased 
international cooperation among states and expanded reliance on international norms and institutions to 
resolve some of their mutual concerns and problems.   
84 See supra notes 59-61,  infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. [check out goldsmith book….]
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rights, the incentives to create and comply with authoritative international human rights 
institutions are limited and the downside significant.  Such states generally have their 
own extensive domestic safeguards to protect individual rights.  However imperfect these 
domestic protections may sometimes be, delegation of authority over such issues to 
international institutions carries with it a potentially troubling loss of self-governance and 
accountability vital to democracy. 85
Among repressive authoritarian governments, the reasons to resist the creation of 
effective international authority are more obvious. Authoritative international institutions 
would threaten not only the undemocratic government’s prerogatives but also could 
challenge its legitimacy and hold on power.  Indeed, all states have certain cynical 
incentives in maintaining a human rights system that lacks authoritative institutions 
capable of binding, enforceable decision-making.  Such arrangements allow states to 
appear righteous, appease critics and avoid undesirable international pressure while 
avoiding the real prospect of meaningful change. 
Perhaps most importantly, the international community also currently lacks 
practical incentives to create an effective system of international enforcement of human 
rights.  Any system that effectively enforces human rights against recalcitrant 
governments will involve sanctions that pose potentially significant costs to other 
competing interests such as trade, security, or foreign relations.  History has shown that 
85 See Donoho, Democratic Legitimacy, supra note 10 at 49-64. There are undoubtedly significant human 
benefits that derive from involvement in an international human rights system even in the context of well 
functioning constitutional democracies.  In many instances, the international community may provide 
incentives for improvement, and a prevailing international consensus might induce changes in social 
attitudes. The point here is simply that the case for providing international institutions with authoritative 
enforcement powers over contested moral issues is not compelling in the context of constitutional 
democracies in light of the accompanying losses of democratic accountability and self governance.  In 
contrast, when governments abuse fundamental rights relating to physical integrity or central political 
rights, the need for effective outside interference is obviously greater and the potential losses to local 
democratic choice and autonomy minimal. See id. at 61-64.
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political and economic power is a better indicator of which governments may face 
international condemnation than actual human rights conditions.  Virtually all states 
generally place their own economic self-interest above principled responses to human 
rights conditions outside their own territory.
Under these circumstances, governments of all stripes have strongly favored an 
emphasis on national enforcement and implementation of human rights via domestic 
institutions, conceding only limited and ambiguous authority for international bodies to 
supervise that process.  They have correspondingly limited international institutions to 
anemic enforcement capacities leaving voluntary compliance the order of the day.
This reliance of national enforcement and volunteerism creates the unfortunate 
irony that the international human rights system is most needed where it is least effective 
and most effective where it is least needed.  In oppressive states, domestic institutions are 
incapable of enforcing human rights. Thus, where most needed – under oppressive 
regimes violating the most fundamental and universally accepted rights – the 
international system’s traditional emphasis on voluntary domestic compliance with 
toothless international supervision is utterly inadequate and doomed to failure. Where 
potentially most effective – in those democratic states which respect the rule of law – an 
authoritative international system is least needed and poses significant costs to
democracy.86
These competing forces have produced a complex and ill-defined balance 
between international and domestic authority that is still evolving but hardly satisfactory 
or even rational.   The international system uneasily straddles the competing goals of 
86 See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text. 
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preserving democratic sovereignty and autonomy and effectively enforcing human rights 
against repressive regimes.  Two of the most significant components in this dilemma are 
the legitimacy deficit of international human rights organizations described above and the 
broad scope of issues potentially under their jurisdiction.  There is an important 
correlation here between these factors and the human rights system’s historical refusal to 
distinguish among different categories of rights for enforcement purposes. 
Human rights institutions (and many states) have historically resisted recognition 
of a hierarchy among rights even for enforcement purposes.  This resistance has been 
based primarily on the ideological position that economic and social rights are of equal 
importance to civil and political rights.87  Whatever the relative merits of that debate, it 
fails to address the practical realities of enforcement.  Indeed, distinctions among rights 
for purposes of enforcement are not hierarchies in the sense of importance at all.  Rather, 
the point of such distinctions are that some rights enjoy a consensus over meaning that 
lends itself to successful international enforcement and the potential development of 
more meaningful international institutional arrangements and incentives for compliance. 
87
 Historically, many non-Western nations have taken the position that economic and social rights have 
priority over civil and political rights.  See generally, Rhoda Howard, The Full-Belly Thesis: Should 
Economic Rights Take Priority Over Civil and Political Rights? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, 5 
HUM. RTS. Q. 467, 469 (1983). See also Melannie Civic, A Comparative Analysis of International and 
Chinese Human Rights Law—Universality Versus Cultural Relativism, 2 BUFF. J. INT’L L. 285, 320-22 
(1996)(describing China's continuing adherence to the argument that economic rights take priority over 
civil and political liberties).  Western states have uniformly rejected that position while at the same time 
cast doubt about the justiciability of economic and social rights.   See generally, M. Dennis & D. Stewart, 
Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There Be An International Complaints 
Mechanism To Adjudicate the Rights To Food, Water, Housing, and Health? 98 AM.J. INT’L L. 462, 472-74 
(       ).  These divergent positions, largely political and rhetorical, initially resulted in the creation of 
separate international covenants for these two groups of rights.  Later, the tension between these viewpoints 
led to numerous United Nations pronouncements about the “indivisibility” and “interdependence” of 
human rights and a clear aversion to any distinctions among rights, however rational. See, e.g., 
Indivisibility and Interdependence of Economic, Social, Cultural, Civil, and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 
44/130, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 209, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1990).
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In the context of our complex and diverse world community, the international 
enforceability of all rights is not the same.  Certain violations, such as torture and most 
crimes against humanity, have a relatively non-controversial and universal meaning. 
They involve conduct that is readily identifiable, easily proved and universally 
condemned by all. For these reasons, such violations are highly suitable for authoritative 
international enforcement mechanisms. Moreover, an enforcement focus on this limited 
range of universally accepted rights substantially enhances the potential for improving 
institutional legitimacy and alleviating fears about usurpation of democratic prerogatives.  
The failure to distinguish among rights for enforcement purposes also relates 
directly to the more general problem of institutional legitimacy and credibility noted 
earlier.  Existing human rights bodies lack institutional capacity and characteristics of 
legitimacy that can engender the trust and respect necessary to support either voluntary 
compliance or allocation of meaningful enforcement authority.  A central aspect of this 
problem is a failure of human rights institutions to develop an appropriate role that 
accounts for differences among rights and respect for genuine democratic choice.  
Both voluntary compliance and authoritative vertical enforcement by international 
institutions have important and mutually reinforcing functions in a world characterized 
by diversity and conflict.  For some rights, an approach emphasizing promotion and 
voluntary compliance with international standards rather than authoritative enforcement 
makes sense. For genuinely contestable rights whose meaning or application is subject to 
public debate within functioning democratic societies, authoritative international 
enforcement is unnecessary, impractical and counterproductive given its implications for 
democracy.  Conversely, for universally accepted and uncontestable rights like torture, 
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authoritative international enforcement is both necessary and achievable.  A failure to 
recognize this practical reality has inhibited the development of meaningful international 
enforcement mechanisms.  
The international system’s traditional approach to enforcement has failed, at least 
in part, because of a failure to recognize such distinctions.  Already saddled with weak 
institutional characteristics and ambiguous grants of authority, international human rights 
bodies are unlikely to engender sufficient state respect to create more authoritative 
enforcement mandates absent a more practical and nuanced approach regarding different 
categories of rights.  
What can and should be done to address these weaknesses and create a 
meaningful system of human rights enforcement in the 21st Century?  There are, of 
course, no easy answers to this question.  Reforms should, however, focus on the 
weaknesses and practical limitations described above.  In this regard, important insights 
can be drawn from developing alternatives to the traditional enforcement model and from 
the success of the ECHR.
III. Modern Developments in Enforcement: The Evolving Paradigms
Last decade has witnessed the continuing development of important alternatives 
to the traditional model of human rights enforcement.88  These alternatives include the 
88 There is a significant body of literature exploring each of these developments, some of which categorizes 
and evaluates them together as “transnational” law and process.  See, e.g., W. Aceves, Liberalism And 
International Legal Scholarship: The Pinochet Case And The Move Toward A Universal System Of 
Transnational Law Litigation, 41 HARV. INT’L L. REV. 129 (2000); W.  Burke-White, A Community Of 
Courts: Toward A System Of International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2002).
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use of domestic criminal processes as reflected in the Pinochet litigation,89 the use of 
domestic civil processes following the Filartiga line of cases,90 and the development of 
international criminal law processes such as the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and Bosnia, 
and the permanent International Criminal Court.91  Each of these alternatives has its 
problems and none is an enforcement panacea.92 As detailed below, however, these 
89
 The Pinochet case and its implications have produced divergent perspectives regarding the appropriate 
limits of human rights litigation and use of domestic criminal processes.  See, e.g., Aceves, supra note 88; 
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights Litigation, 97 MICH. L. 
REV. 2129 (1999); Jonathan I. Charney, Progress in International Criminal Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 452 
(1999).
90
 Filartiga v. Pena Irala, 630 F. 2d 876 (1980).  The Second Circuit’s decision in Filartiga has generated a 
tremendous outpouring of scholarly work.  Among many helpful articles arguing for expansive use of the 
Alien Tort Statute see, e.g., Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Human 
Rights Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 
1 (2002); Beth Sephens, Taking Pride in International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 485 
(2001); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal 
Common Law, 66 FORD. L. REV. 463, 514 (1997); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About 
Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORD. L. REV. 371 
(1997); and Beth Van Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: the Domestic Enforcement of Human Rights 
Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague Convention, 42 HARV. INT’L  L. J. 141 (2001).   Critics of the 
Filartiga paradigm include Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, supra
note 18; Jack Goldsmith & Curtis Bradley, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights 
Litigation, 66 FORD. L. REV. 319, 356-68 (1997).  The case has also spawned considerable litigation 
including lawsuits against multi-national corporations.  See Beth Stephens, Individuals Enforcing 
International Law, supra note 18 at 437-38 (approximately 100 cases leading to published decisions under 
the ATCA); Gregory Tzeutschler, Corporate Violator: The Alien Tort Liability of Transnational 
Corporations for Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 359 (1999)(describing and 
arguing in favor of litigation aimed at multinationals).  The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004) placed significant, although yet to be fully elaborated, limitations 
on actions brought under the ATCA.  See infra note   and accompanying text.  See generally, The Supreme 
Court, 2003 Term, Leading Cases, 118 HARV. L. REV. 446 (2004); Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 111 (2004).
91
 Perhaps the best places to find factual and legal background information on the United Nations’ ad hoc 
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are their respective websites.  See http://www.un.org/icty/
(ICTY) and http://www.ictr.org     (ICTR). Much has been written, of course, about these tribunals and how 
they have functioned.  For a thought provoking critique of these tribunals focused on Rwanda, see Jose 
Alvarez, Crimes Of States/Crimes Of Hate: Lessons From Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 365 (1999).  See 
also Makau wa Mutua, Never Again: Questioning the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, 11 TEMPLE INT’L & 
COMP. L. J. 167 (1997). A third ad hoc tribunal with distinct characteristics was created 2001 by agreement 
between the Security Council and Sierra Leone regarding human rights crimes committed during that 
country’s recent civil conflict.  S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4186th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1315 (2000). See generally, Laura Hall & Naha Kazemi, Prospects For Justice And Reconciliation 
In Sierra Leone, 44 HARV. INT’L L. J. 287 (2003).  The “mixed” domestic and international process of this 
“Special Court for Sierra Leone” recently served as a model for similar institutions in East Timor and 
Cambodia. See Antonio Cassese, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 343 (Oxford Press, 2003).
92 See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
Donoho Final Draft 4-19-06
35
alternative approaches do provide some direct advantages over existing approaches to 
human rights enforcement and, more significantly, provide important insights regarding 
potential reform of the existing international system.  These advantages and insights stem 
primarily from three characteristics shared by each alternative.  The first is a common 
focus on a fairly narrow range of well defined and universally agreed upon human rights 
norms.  The second is reliance on, or creation of, generally neutral judicial institutions 
with clearly defined and appropriately constrained legal authority over these universally 
understood and non-controversial rights.  The third is recognition of individual 
accountability for the violation of such rights. 
A. National Criminalization of International Law Violations: The Pinochet Model
In 1996, Spanish judicial authorities accepted jurisdiction to conduct a criminal 
investigation regarding alleged human rights violations committed by government 
authorities in Argentina and Chile during military rule.93   In October 1998, Judge
Baltazar Garzon requested that the United Kingdom extradite former Chilean dictator 
Augosto Pinochet to Spain to face criminal charges resulting from this investigation.  The 
relevant indictment charged Pinochet with conspiracy to commit torture, hostage taking, 
genocide and summary execution of both Chilean and Spanish citizens during his 17 year 
reign of terror that began with a September 11, 1973 coup.  This request for extradition 
asserted not only jurisdiction based on alleged crimes against Spanish citizens, often 
93 For a clear account of the factual background of the case see Richard Wilson, Prosecuting Pinochet in 
Spain, 6 Hum. Rts. Brief, Issues 3 (1999). See also Diane Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling 
Universal Jurisdiction With Democratic Principles, 92 GEO. L. J. 1057, 1070-1086 (2004)(providing a 
detailed description of the Pinochet case from factual background through the extradition process);  Naomi 
Roht-Arriaza, Symposium: Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects: The Pinochet 
Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 311, 311-15 (2001). 
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referred to as “passive jurisdiction,”94 but also for crimes against Chilean citizens under a 
theory of universal jurisdiction.95  The British courts denied extradition as to many of the 
alleged crimes on technical legal grounds relating to the requirement of dual 
criminality.96  The British House of Lords, however, ultimately approved the extradition 
request as to a limited number of crimes alleged to have occurred after British accession 
to the Torture Convention.  U.K. foreign minister Jack Straw ultimately denied the 
extradition request on discretionary grounds related to the Pinochet’s allegedly failing 
mental health.97
94See Roht-Arrianza, supra note 93 at 314-15; Orentlicher, supra note 93 at 1074.  See Restatement (Third) 
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 402 cmt. G (1987) (providing the commonly accepted 
definition of passive personality jurisdiction).
95See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 93 at 1073-74.  See also Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations 
Law of The United States § 404 (1987)(providing definition and description of universal jurisdiction); 
Princeton University Program In Law And Public Affairs, The Princeton Principles On Universal 
Jurisdiction 23 (2001), available at http:// www.princeton.edu/~lapa/unive_jur.pdf .  Professor Orentlicher 
points out that there are few clear prior examples of national courts relying on principles of universal 
jurisdiction to justify prosecution of criminal conduct that took place outside of their territorial 
jurisdiction. Id.   Israel’s prosecution of Eichmann is a commonly cited example. Attorney Gen. of Israel 
v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18, 26 (Isr. Dist. Ct. Jm. 1961), aff'd, 36 I.L.R. 277, 298 (Isr. S. Ct. 1962). See 
also United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 901 (D. DC 1988) aff’d, 924 F. 2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
Originally developed in response to piracy, see United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 153, 156 
(1820) ( "[P]irates being hostes humani generis, are punishable in the tribunals of all nations.  All nations 
are engaged in a league against them for the mutual defence and safety of all."), universal jurisdiction 
played a central role in the Nuremberg prosecutions and remains a critical concept in contemporary 
international criminal law. See notes   infra. See also Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern 
Universal Jurisdiction's Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV INT’L L. J. 183 (2004) (critiquing the analogy to 
piracy as a justification for modern applications of universal jurisdiction).
96 Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 
(H.L. 2000).  See Frank Sullivan, Jr., A Separation Of Powers Perspective On Pinochet, 14 IND. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 409, 415-37 (2004) (providing a detailed description of the legal proceedings in the United 
Kingdom, including the legal analysis provided by the House of Lords) .
97 See Sullivan, supra note 96 at 437-40. A commonly cited problem with utilizing universal jurisdiction to 
prosecute individuals having little or no connection to the forum involves resistance in the home nation to 
outside interference.  See, e.g., A. Sammons, The "Under-Theorization" Of Universal Jurisdiction: 
Implications For Legitimacy On Trials Of War Criminals By National Courts, 21 BERK J. INT’L L. 111, 
140-43 (2003); Henry Kissenger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction: Risking Judicial Tyranny, FOREIGN 
AFF., July/ August 2001 at 86. The exercise of universal jurisdiction also raises legitimate fears of bias, 
violations of due process, politically motivated prosecutions and increased international conflict. See, e.g., 
Madeline Morris, Universal Jurisdiction In A Divided World: Conference Remarks, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
337, 340, 352-59 (2001.  See K. Lee Boyd, Universal Jurisdiction And Structural Reasonableness, 40 TX. 
J. INT’L L.1, 1-2, (2004)(suggesting that traditional constraints on judicial action alleviate many concerns).
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The Court’s decision, although more limited than many advocates hoped, directly 
supported the proposition that universal jurisdiction may justify domestic criminal 
prosecution of certain violations of international human rights in states other than the one 
in which the offending acts were committed.98 More controversially, the decision also 
recognized important limitations on public official immunities.99 The British and Spanish 
courts, in essence, recognized that Pinochet, and others like him, could be prosecuted for 
certain universal crimes through the domestic criminal processes of any state that obtains 
personal jurisdiction over him. Citing criminal investigations or complaints brought in 
Belgium, Senegal, Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, Professor Dianne Orentlicher reports that a “raft 
of countries have walked through the door the Pinochet case opened.” 100 Enthusiasm 
for Pinochet styled prosecutions has apparently waned, however, in light of controversial 
criminal complaints brought against prominent current or former public officials such as 
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, former President Bush, Colin Powell, General 
Tommy Franks and Dick Cheney, among others.101
98
 Orentlicher, supra note 93 at 1074; Aceves, supra note 88 at 169-171. 
99 See Ex Parte Pinochet, supra note 96 at 206-24.  See Orentlicher, supra note 93 at 1080-89. Spanish 
judicial authorities also separately ruled against Pinochet’s claims of immunity.  See Roht-Arrianza, supra 
note 93 at 313.   Among the primary reasons that judicial refusal to recognize traditional immunities is 
controversial involves alleged interference with national reconciliation compromises and foreign affairs.  
See Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty To Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior 
Regime, 100 Yale L. J. 2537, 2543-46 (1991).  The International Court of Justice, however, recently 
reaffirmed immunities in the case of The Congo v. Belguim, at least for incumbent public officials.  Case 
Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium), 2002 ICJ 
General List No 121 (Feb 14, 2002) available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/iCOBEframe.htm . See Sarah Rispin, Implications of 
Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium on the Pinochet Precedent: A Setback for International Human 
Rights Litigation? 3 Chi. J. Int’l L. 527, 527-30, 535-36 (2002).   See also Certain Criminal Proceedings in 
France (Republic of the Congo v. France) available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2002/ipresscom2002-37_xx_20021209.htm (challenge to the legality of 
France’s pursuit of criminal charges against the Congolese Interior Minister Pierre Oba).
100
 Orentlicher, supra note 93 at 1059-60.    
101 See Steven Ratner, Belgium’s War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 A.J. Int’l L. 888, 891-94 (2003); 
Damien Vandermeersch, 3 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 400, 404-09; Glenn Frankel, Belgian War Crimes Law 
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B. The Filartiga Civil Litigation Paradigm 
In 1980, the Second Circuit upheld federal district jurisdiction over a civil claim 
brought by a Paraguay citizen against a Paraguay public official for torture that occurred 
in Paraguay.102  Building slowly over subsequent years, the Filaritga model for civil 
liability against human rights violators has now generated a substantial number of 
cases,103 recently including those directed at multinational corporations.104  Much written 
Undone by its Global Reach; Cases Against Political Figures Sparked Crises, Wash. Post, Sept. 30, 2003, 
at A1. See also David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 85, 147-48 
(2004).  Spain’s high court has also apparently retreated somewhat from the implications of Magistrate 
Garzon’s pursuit of General Pinochet, imposing limitations on potential applications of universal criminal 
jurisdiction in Spanish courts.  See Antonio Cassese, Is the Bell Tolling for Universality? A Plea for a 
Sensible Notion of Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 589, 590 (2003)(Spanish high court 
suggests that universal jurisdiction is “subsidiary” to prosecution in the home state and that additional links 
to Spain will normally be required).
102
 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
103
 Professor Stephens, an experienced human rights litigator who has written extensively on the ATCA, 
has reported that “approximately one hundred cases leading to decisions available online have alleged 
jurisdiction under the ATCA and related statutes…” Stephens, Individuals Enforcing International Law , 
supra note 18 at 437-38. See also Sandra Coliver, Jennie Green, Paul Hoffman, Holding Human Rights 
Violators Accountable by Using International Law in U.S. Courts: Advocacy Efforts and Complementary 
Strategies, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 169, 173 (2005)(citing “at least sixteen” successful suits); Boyd, supra 
note   at 3, n.6 & App. A (cataloguing 92 cases, nearly 80% of which resulted in summary judgment or 
dismissal).  Two organizations, the Center for Justice and Accountability (http://www.cja.org ), and the 
Center for Constitutional Rights (http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/human_rights/human_rights.asp ) have 
served prominent roles in bringing actions against human rights violators before U.S. courts. Although 
many cases have been brought, relatively few have resulted in judgments and almost none in actual 
collection of damages.  See note 150 infra. But see Alfonso Chardy, Torture Lawsuit Halts Lotto Winnings, 
Miami Herald, March 31, 2006 at A-1 (state court orders that annual lottery payments of former Haitian 
Army Colonel Carl Dorelien be placed in escrow pending resolution of Alien Torts Claims Act litigation in 
federal court).
104 See, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 952-54 (9th Cir. 2002)(denying summary judgment on claims 
that Unocal was liable under the ATCA for aiding the Mynmar Military in acts of murder, rape, and forced 
labor);Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 226 F. 3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000); Jota v. Texaco, 157 F. 3d 153 (2d Cir. 
1998)(later dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds in Aguinda v. Texaco, 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D. 
N.Y. 2001). See generally Recent Developments, Corporate Liability for Violations of International 
Human Rights Law, 114 HAR. L. REV. 2025 (2001); Case Note, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: A New 
Standard For Enforcement Of International Law In U.S. Courts? 5 YALE H. R. & DEV. L. J. 241 (2002).  
The Unocal case was recently settled.  See Center for Constitutional Rights,  http://www.ccr-
ny.org/v2/legal/corporate_accountability/corporateArticle.asp?ObjID=lrRSFKnmmm&Content=45 (visited 
Sept. 23, 2005).  Although no cases brought against corporate defendants under the ATCA have resulted in 
an adverse final judgment see International Labor Rights Fund Web Page,  
http://www.laborrights.org/projects/corporate/ATCA%20summaries.htm (providing a summary of cases 
brought against corporate defendants under the ATCA), the business community and the Bush 
administration have launched a frontal assault on such suits.  See Bush v. Alien Torts, available at 
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about,105 this enforcement alternative essentially envisions opening regular domestic civil 
courts to human rights victims seeking redress for violations occurring outside of the 
forum.  
In the United States, where such remedies have been most prominently pursued, 
jurisdiction is conferred by statute and subject to significant limitations.106  These 
limitations include tight restrictions on suing foreign government defendants,107 due 
process requirements regarding personal jurisdiction that essentially require, as a 
practical matter, the physical presence of individual defendants in the United States,108
and significant restrictions on available causes of action.  Given the limited legal status of 
U.S. human rights treaty commitments,109 customary international law has played a 
http://www.motherjones.com/news/dailymojo/2003/08/we_522_03a.html ; Harold Koh, Wrong on Rights, 
available at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=2121 (criticizing the Bush administration’s 
position).
105
 There is a mountain of excellent literature regarding the ATCA ranging from discourse over its history 
to the policy implications of utilizing customary international law to remedy human rights violations with 
no direct nexus to the United States.  See authorities cited in note 90, supra.
106
 Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350; Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 
(2)(2000).  It is standard practice in U.S. human rights litigations to allege alternative bases for subject 
matter jurisdiction including federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. § 1331 and universal 
jurisdiction as a matter of customary international law.  
107
 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S. C. § § 1330, 1605, has made it nearly impossible to 
successfully sue foreign government and their instrumentalities in U.S. courts for violations of human 
rights. See Coliver, et al, supra note 103  at 188.  The only potentially viable exception to immunity under 
the act relates to violations against U.S. citizens by foreign governments designated as state sponsors of 
terrorism.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (7); Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997).  
See also Letelier v. Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.C. Cir. 1980) and Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F. 21d 
1419 (9th Cir. 1989)(cases in which a foreign state committed a human rights violation on United States 
territory thereby losing its immunity under § 1605(5)).
108 See Beth Van Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress, supra note 90 at 153-55, 176, 194-96 (describing 
the importance of “presence” as a basis for personal jurisdiction in ATCA litigation and its role during 
negotiations of the Hague Judgments Convention).  Van Schaack describes significant opposition to so-
called “tag” jurisdiction that has served as the basis for some ATCA lawsuits such as the Kadic case.  Id.  
109
 The United States has ratified several major international human rights treaties but, without exception, 
declared each of these to be “non-self-executing.”  See Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Treaties, Human 
Rights and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA L. REV. 399, 416-23 (2000). The United States has also 
attached a series of “RUD’s” (reservations, understandings or declarations) to each human rights treaty it 
has ratified.  These provisions are designed to systematically eliminate potential conflicts with pre-existing 
U.S. law and practice.  See, e.g., Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: the Ghost 
of Senator Bricker, 89 A.J. INT’L L. 341, 345-48 (1995); Krisina Ash, Comment, U.S. Reservations to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Credibility Maximization and Global Influence, 3 
NW U. J.  INT’L H. R. 3 (2005). Elizabeth Mayer, Reflections on Proposed United States Reservations to 
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central role in the development of the Filartiga paradigm.110   Since only a small number 
of human rights violations are considered part of customary international law,111 lower 
federal courts have recognized a limited number of actionable violations.  The Supreme 
Court has recently placed further, potentially significant limits on the types of violations 
that may be actionable under the ATCA.112 Although United States legislation 
specifically authorizes causes of action for certain foreign victims of torture and summary 
execution,113 the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of the ATSC essentially suggests
that recognition of remedies for other violations will be limited to those comparable to 
18th Century customary international law paradigms, such as piracy.114
CEDAW: Should the Constitution Be An Obstacle to Human Rights, 23 HAST. L. Q. 727, 747-67 (1996). 
Such treaty obligations are, therefore, unenforceable under domestic law and U.S. courts have refused to 
remedy their violation under the ATCA unless the violation alleged can be established as part of customary 
international law.  See, e.g., Filartiga, supra note   at 880-85; Jama v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 338, 357-61 
(D.N.J. 2004).
110
 Filartiga and the ATCA have, for example, figured prominently in the academic debate over the 
legitimacy of customary international law as a source of U.S. domestic law. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & 
Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 
110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Goodman & Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing, supra note 90. See also Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 at 2770-76   (Scalia, concurring).
111 See Restatement of Foreign Relations, Third, § 702 (1987)(listing seven violations including genocide, 
torture, murder or causing disappearance, slavery, systematic racial discrimination, prolonged arbitrary 
detention and a “consistent pattern of gross violations”).
112
 In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2755-64 (2004), the Supreme Court upheld use of the 
ATCA to litigate alleged human rights violations occurring overseas but placed significant limits on which 
violations could be actionable.  In many ways consistent with lower court rulings, the Court found that the 
ATCA is purely a jurisdictional statute under which only those violations that share certain characteristics 
with claims judicially cognizable when the statute was adopted in 1787, such as piracy, can be brought. Id.  
While the precise meaning of this standard is debatable, it is consistent with lower court decisions that have 
only recognized claims involving “specific, universal and obligatory” norms of international law.  See In re 
Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F. 3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994); Harvard Law Review, The 
Supreme Court, 2003 Term Leading Cases, 118 HARV. L.REV. 446 (2004); Beth Stephens, Sosa V. Alvarez-
Machain: "The Door Is Still Ajar" For Human Rights Litigation In U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533 
(2004-2005)(reviewing the history of the ATCA and its future after the Sosa decision). See also
Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa, supra note 95.
113
 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2)(2000). The TVPA has been described as 
“codifying” the holding of Filartiga. See Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 138 (E.D. N.Y. 1994). Its 
primary impetus, however, was to dispel any doubt about the existence of a cause of action under the 
ACTA for torture and summary execution.  See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, S. Rep. 102-249, 
102nd Cong. (Nov. 19, 1991); Goodman & Jinks, supra note 90 at 467.
114
 Sosa, 124 S. Ct.  at 2761. See note 112 supra.  
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C. The Developing Use of International Criminal Law Processes
A third significant development in human rights enforcement involves the 
continuing evolution of international criminal law and its processes.  Between Nuremberg 
and the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1980, international criminal law remained mired in 
world politics with little practical salience to human rights victims.  The prospects for an 
effective international criminal law process for human rights violations were kept alive 
only in academic circles and on the backburners of a few obscure international 
institutions. 
Atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, however, revived the prospects 
for creating an effective international criminal enforcement regime.  Viewed as a threat to 
peace, these atrocities prompted the U.N. Security Counsel to establish two ad hoc 
tribunals with a mandate to deploy international humanitarian law in the defense of 
human rights.115  Despite substantial obstacles,116 the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) has indicted 161 alleged perpetrators of serious violations of 
115
 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, 
annexed to Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 3175th 
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993); International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in 
the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations 
Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/Res/ 955 (1994). Each tribunal has the authority "to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations 
of international humanitarian law” committed in limited geographical areas and time frames. (Art. 1) 
However, due to distinctions drawn by international humanitarian law between international and internal 
civil conflicts, there are differences in the subject matter jurisdiction of the two tribunals.  See Mark R. Von 
Sternberg, A Comparison Of The Yugoslavian And Rwandan War Crimes Tribunals: Universal Jurisdiction 
And The "Elementary Dictates Of Humanity, 22 BROOK. INT’L L. J. 111, 113-21 (1996).  In particular, only 
the ICTY is technically empowered to enforce grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, while both 
Tribunals may prosecute customary international law violations involving war crimes (Art.3), genocide 
(Art. 4) and crimes against humanity (Art.5). Id. 
116 See Gabrielle Kirk-McDonald, 25 NOVA L. REV.464, 468-70 (2001)(former President of the tribunal 
describing the initial lack of support for its work); Mutua, supra note 91 at 180-85 (citing lack of resources 
and inadequate cooperation has serious impediments to the tribunals’ work)
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humanitarian law.117  The Tribunal has found approximately 50 defendants guilty and 40 
are currently serving their sentence or awaiting transfer.118 More than 70 other defendants 
are on trial, in detention or under provisional release.  Until his recent death, these 
included the former leader of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic.119 The International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda has completed 17 prosecutions, primarily of public officials, for 
crimes relating to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.120 As of March, 2005, twenty-five 
additional defendants were on trial.121 Although subject to legitimate criticisms,122 these 
ad hoc tribunals have, without doubt, exceeded most expectations.123
 The success of these ad hoc tribunals provided the needed political will to 
revitalize long standing U.N. plans to establish a permanent international criminal 
court.124   Since the ICC began operations in 2002, 125 it has received 4 requests to 
117 See ICTY At A Glance, http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm .
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 See Achievements of the ITCR, http://www.ictr.org/default.htm .
121 Id.
122 See generally Jose Alvarez, Crimes Of States/Crimes Of Hate: Lessons From Rwanda, 24 Yale Int’l L. 
J. 365 (1999)(providing an insightful critique of the premises which prompted the ad hoc tribunals and 
potential ill-effects of primary international jurisdiction);Todd Howland & William Calathes, The U.N.'S 
International Criminal Tribunal, Is It Justice Or Jingoism for Rwanda? A Call For Transformation, 39 Va. 
J. Int’l L.   135 (1998)(critiquing failures to develop coherent vision of the tribunal in relation to human 
rights generally and to national processes); Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts And Fair 
Trials: Difficulties And Prospects, 27 Yale J. Int’l L. 111, 116-37 (2002)(critiquing deficiencies relating to 
presenting an effective defense).
123
 Perhaps in response to the perceived successes and failures of the first two ad hoc tribunals, the 
international community has participated in the creation of “hybrid” or “mixed” tribunals to address human 
rights violations in Sierra Leone, Kosovo and East Timor. See generally Laura Dickinson, The Promise of 
Hybrid Courts, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 295, 296-300 (2003); Cassese, supra note 91 at 343-46 (Oxford, 2003);
Hall & Kazemi, supra note 91. Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, these new tribunals are designed as “mixed” 
tribunals in the sense that they incorporate and rely on both domestic and international law and are staffed 
by both domestic and international decision-makers.  See Dickinson, supra at 296-300.  
124
 Casesse, supra note 91 at 341. The initial impetus for a permanent international criminal court came 
from the U.N. General Assembly after World War II.  See G.A. Res. 260B, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt.1, at 
177, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). For an account of these earlier efforts to establish the court and a brief 
history of modern international criminal law leading to the U.N. ad hoc tribunals, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent International 
Criminal Court, 10 Harv. Hum. Rts J. 11 (1997). See also Casesse, supra note 91 at 327-346. 
125
 The treaty establishing the Court came into force after receiving its sixtieth ratification in 2002.  See
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
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investigate situations alleged to involve crimes under the treaty.126  Although important 
aspects of the Court’s jurisdiction are distinct from its predecessors,127 the Court was 
clearly modeled after currently existing ad hoc tribunals.  Like the ad hoc tribunals, the 
Court is essentially designed to address “serious crimes of international concern” in the 
general categories of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.128  Each 
category of crime is further defined in the Treaty to include a variety of egregious 
violations of human rights committed in the context of armed conflict, such murder, 
ethnic cleansing, rape and torture.129  The Treaty also creates a process for defining the 
required elements to the crimes.130  While some important and difficult disputes over the 
definition of such crimes have and will arise,131 the Court’s substantive focus is limited to 
the most egregious forms of human rights violations over which an international 
consensus generally exists.
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, art. 8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998)[hereinafter ICC 
Treaty]. See Official Website of the ICC, About the ICC, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/about.html
126
 The Congo, Uganda and the Central African Republic have each referred situations occurring within 
their territory to the ICC Prosecutor for investigation and possible prosecution.  The Prosecutor is also now 
investigating the situation in Darfur, Sudan pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005).  See 
Official Website of the ICC, Situations and Cases, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases.html .  
127 See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
128 See ICC Treaty, supra note 125, art. 5.  The Court will eventually also exercise jurisdiction over the 
“Crime of Aggression,” once the state parties reach agreement over the definition of that controversial 
concept. 
129
 ICC Treaty, supra note 125 at Art. 6, 7, 8.
130
 ICC Treaty, supra note 125 at Art. 9.
131 Opponents of the ICC have cited, in addition to potential third-country jurisdiction over U.S. military 
personnel, definitional ambiguity over critical concepts such as military necessity, proportionality, 
military targets, and the crime of aggression.  See Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal 
Court, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89, 95-96 (2003); Ruth Wedgwood, The Irresolution of Rome, 64 Law & 
Contemp. Prob. 193, 209-13 (2001)(discussing the crime of aggression among other definitional issues); 
See also Symposium: The International Responses to the Environmental Impacts of War, 17 Geo. Int'l 
Envtl. L. Rev. 565, 625-26 (comments of Mark Drumbl) (2005); Valerie Oosterveld, The Definition Of 
"Gender" In The Rome Statute Of The International Criminal Court: A Step Forward Or Back For 
International Criminal Justice?, 18 Harv. Hum. Rts J. 55 (2005); Allison Danner & Jenny Martinez, 
Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of 
International Criminal Law, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 75 (2005).  But see David Hunt, The International Criminal 
Court: High Hopes, Creative Ambiguity and An Unfortunate Mistrust in International Judges, 2 J. Int’l 
Crim. Justice 56 (2004) (criticizing an overly restrictive use of detailed definitions that undermine 
flexibility).
Donoho Final Draft 4-19-06
44
Unlike the ad hoc tribunals, however, the ICC has broad geographic jurisdiction 
but only complementary or subsidiary jurisdiction over the prosecution of accused war 
criminals.132  In effect, the ICC is designed to prosecute violations of a clearly defined set 
of international crimes only when the state of origin is unable or unwilling to do so in 
good faith.133  The Rome Treaty also allows for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over non-
party nationals when that defendant commits prosecutable offenses in the territory of a 
state party.134  The Court may also exercise jurisdiction over a non-party national who 
commits prosecutable crimes in a non-party state if that state specially agrees to such 
jurisdiction.135 This provision , and allegedly insufficient Security Council oversight
power, has caused considerable controversy and figures prominently in the Bush 
administration’s active campaign to undermine the ICC and its potential jurisdiction over 
Americans.136
D. Lessons From the ECHR: Institutional Legitimacy and Practical Incentives 
The ECHR is neither new, nor in the strict sense of the word, a developing 
alternative to the traditional model of human rights enforcement.  Originally created just 
after WWII,137 the ECHR has had a longer history than most international human rights 
132
 ICC Treaty, supra note 125 at Art. 17.
133 Id. at Art. 17-19.
134 Id. at Art. 12 (2). 
135 Id.  at Art. 12 (3)
136 See Goldsmith, supra note 131 at 90-98; Casey and Rivkin, The Limits of Legitimacy: The Rome 
Statute's Unlawful Application to Non-State Parties, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 63,63-64 (2003); William Schabas, 
United States Hostility To The International Criminal Court: It's All About The Security Council, 15 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 701, 714-19 (2004)(like Goldsmith, also attributing independence from the U.N. Security 
Council as part of U.S. opposition to the ICC).
137
 Created under the Council of Europe, the Court was formed through the adoption of the European 
Convention of Human Rights by Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.  The Convention preamble emphasizes 
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bodies and considerably more success.  In many ways, the ECHR represents the only 
example of a traditional international enforcement paradigm that functions effectively, 
albeit only on a regional level.138
There are, of course, many reasons to doubt whether the sui generis circumstances 
of the ECHR qualify it to serve as a realistic model for other more global institutions.139
The community of nations that the ECHR serves has been, at least until recently, 
significantly homogeneous with shared cultural, social and political affinities.140  More 
importantly, the region has a shared history and future, not the least of which involves the 
extraordinary economic, social and political entanglements of the European Union.
Although technically and legally distinct from the European Human Rights system and 
the ECHR, the institutions of the EU have adopted significant commitments to human 
rights, following the direction and guidance of the ECHR. 141  These linkages create 
the parties’ commonalities, describing members as "like-minded and hav[ing] a common heritage of 
political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law…”
138 See generally Helfer & Slaughter, Supranational Adjudication, supra note 7(promoting the European 
system as a model of effective international adjudication of human rights).
139
 Donoho, Universalism, supra note 80 at 463-66.
140
 Membership in the Council of Europe has increased dramatically in recent years, especially due to the 
addition of former socialist states from Central and Eastern Europe.  Since 1990, membership in the 
Council has increased to 46 states, with 26 new members from Central and Eastern Europe.   Web site of 
the Council of Europe, available at http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/about_coe/ (last visited March 3, 2006).  
All of these states have also ratified the European Convention on Human Rights as an unwritten 
precondition for membership in the Council.  David Seymour, The Extension of the European Convention 
on Human Rights to Central and Eastern Europe: Prospects and Risks, 8 CONN. J. INT’L L. 242, 250 
(1993). See also Rudolf Bernhardt, Current Development: Reform of the Control Machinery Under the 
European Convention on Human Rights: Protocol 11, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 145, 147 n. 10 (1995).  The 
addition of states such as Bulgaria, Russia, Albania, Romania and Slovenia, has added significant new 
diversity to the European human rights system.  See Seymour, supra at 244-47.
141
 Over the course of many years, the European Court of Justice has slowly incorporated human rights law 
as developed and interpreted by the ECHR, into EU jurisprudence.  See generally Dinah Shelton, The 
Boundaries Of Human Rights Jurisdiction In Europe, 13 DUKE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 95, 111-118 (2003).  
The ECJ has, however, declared that EU may not become a member of the European Convention: "As 
Community law now stands, the Community has no competence to accede to the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms because no provision of the Treaty confers on 
the Community institutions in a general way the power to enact rules concerning human rights or to 
conclude international agreements in this field...." Case 2/94, Accession by the Community to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1996 E.C.R. I-1759 (advisory 
opinion). Recent revisions to the EU treaty regime directly reference protection of human rights.  See
Donoho Final Draft 4-19-06
46
vitally important incentives for compliance that are currently absent outside of Europe.  
Despite these important differences in circumstances, the ECHR’s successes provide 
important insights regarding reform of international enforcement generally.
First, the ECHR serves as proof positive that there are many advantages to 
regional rather than global approaches to human rights enforcement.  Regionalism may 
not only take advantage of cultural and social affinities (in developing culturally sensitive 
interpretations of rights) but also profit from critical economic and political linkages that 
create practical incentives for state compliance.  A regional focus also has advantages for 
institutional legitimacy by increasing connections between decision-makers and local 
populations.  
Second, although the ECHR currently renders judgments over a wide range of 
human rights issues including controversial topics,142 it has arrived at this point 
incrementally over time as its prestige and credibility warranted.  More importantly, it 
has imposed on itself important jurisprudential limits that avoid overreaching and 
undesirable interference with legitimate cultural and policy preferences of its constituent 
national democracies.  Primary among these are the principles of subsidiary, European 
supervision and the margin of appreciation doctrine that utilizes European consensus to 
Shelton, supra at 113-14. In 2000, the EU proclaimed a new Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.  
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1.   The proposed European 
Constitution would directly incorporate the Charter and human rights into the EU legal structure. See
Stephen Sieberson, How the New European Union Constitution Will Allocate Power Between the EU and 
Its Member States—A Textual Analysis, 37 VAND. J. TRAN’L L. 993 (2004).
142 See, e.g., Cossey v. United Kingdom, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622 (1991); B. v. France, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 
(1993)(transexualism);  X v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 143, 169 (1997) (state refusal to register 
transsexual as father of child conceived through artificial insemination); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981)(homosexual sodomy); Wingrove v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 6-
17, 19-21 (1997) (upholding government refusal to license video based on blasphemous content).  
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limit the court’s interpretive alternatives.143  This reliance on consensus over the meaning 
of rights has been a crucial component in the evolution of the court’s legitimacy and, 
correspondingly, its ultimate success in enforcement.  
Third, the court’s institutional practices, ranging from selection of judges to 
litigation procedures, are far more professional and credible than those of most other 
international human rights enforcement institutions.  The full time employment of highly 
trained professional judges and staff, vetted by the domestic political processes of the 
state parties and provided with adequate financial resources, is fundamental to the 
ECHR’s success.  Finally, as previously noted, the ECHR benefits enormously from 
social, political and economic linkages, which provide substantial incentives for
compliance with the Court’s decisions.  The development of such incentives, tied to the 
decisions of reformed international institutions focused on universally understood rights, 
may prove crucial to the eventual enforceability of international rights generally.
IV.  The Future of Human Rights Enforcement
Both the success of the ECHR and developing enforcement alternatives described 
above potentially have two significant implications for the future of human rights 
enforcement.  First, these developments have some potential for creating effective 
alternatives to more traditional approaches to enforcement. As noted below, however, 
there are certain problematic aspects to these alternatives that may limit their potential 
usefulness in this regard.  Second, and perhaps more importantly, these developing 
143 See generally Donoho, Autonomy, Self-Governance and the Margin of Appreciation, supra note 22 at 
450-66.
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alternatives may provide critical insights regarding how to remedy critical weaknesses in 
existing approaches and institutions. 
A. Providing Effective Enforcement Alternatives
How might the enforcement alternatives described above directly advance the 
effectiveness of human rights?  In the first instance, all three alternatives have some 
potential for enhancing deterrence against violations of international standards.  
Traditional enforcement techniques, aimed almost exclusively at governments, currently 
provide limited deterrence against human rights violations.  It is true, of course, that the 
dearth of realistic practical incentives and consequences for governments is central to this 
lack of effective deterrence and most ultimately be addressed.144  However, it seems 
equally rational to believe that an increased focus on individual accountability should 
improve deterrence by creating significant personal disincentives for individual 
perpetrators of abuse.  Although currently only a potential, an optimist could easily 
envision a network of states utilizing universal jurisdiction to provide criminal and civil 
remedies in a fashion that denies “safe haven” to individual human rights violators.145
An important first step in preventing violations is eliminating the perception of individual 
impunity generated by current conditions. 
This focus on individual accountability also tends to circumvent the paucity of 
government incentives to effectively enforce international standards against other 
governments.  Both the Filartiga and Pinochet style remedies are dependant to some 
144 See supra notes 80, 84-86, 141-43 and accompanying text.
145
 This is a common theme of those who advocate use of transnational litigation.  See, e.g., Colliver, Green 
& Hoffman, Holding Human Rights Violators Accountable By Using International Law in the U.S. Courts, 
19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 169, 177-79 (2005).
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degree on the political will of the host forum which must, in the first instance, generally 
authorize such remedies.146  However, if appropriately limited to avoid overt political 
abuse and conflicts with national foreign policy, neither remedy should depend directly
on case by case government bound motivations, which are inevitably linked to competing 
policy and political interests.  Once such actions are authorized by domestic law, 
particular cases are at least partly isolated from competing national interests. This, and 
increased victim access and control over remedies, should lessen the potential for 
political manipulations—a problem that has often plagued the work of international 
human rights bodies.  
Finally, although in distinct ways, each of these developing enforcement 
alternatives avoids some of the institutional weaknesses reflected in the traditional 
mechanisms for enforcement.147  Domestic institutions utilized under the Filartiga and 
Pinochet paradigms will usually enjoy well-established authority and effective means for 
effectuating their decisions.  Domestic courts, for example, are more likely to be staffed 
by independent professional judges and their jurisdiction defined and controlled by 
legislation.  Also subject to a degree of public accountability, such institutions enjoy 
attributes of legitimacy and credibility currently lacking in most existing international 
forums.148
146
 The host forum legal system must authorize or approve such remedies, typically through legislative or 
judicial action.  Similarly, criminal prosecutions such as in Pinochet will typically depend on discretionary 
judgments made by government prosecutors or judges. See, e.g., supra notes 93-97, 100 and accompanying 
text.
147
 International institutions currently have many built-in limitations on their enforcement capacity, some of 
which are inherent.  See supra notes 42-54, 60-63, 74-77 and accompanying text.  Reliance on well-
established and respected domestic institutions with regularized enforcement capacity helps avoid some of 
these limitations. 
148
 There is, however, at least one sense in which foreign domestic institutions will lack an important 
component of legitimacy.  Decisions rendered by foreign domestic processes regarding extraterritorial 
events possess neither intrinsic connections nor elements of local accountability to the people and culture of 
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It is easy, however, to overstate the potential enforcement value of these 
alternatives. The options described above are, at least for now, not sufficiently 
widespread or accepted to make significant advances towards alleviating human rights 
abuses.149  Put into perspective, it is difficult to view the limited number of civil 
judgments against foreign defendants brought before U.S. courts as anything other than 
symbolic.150  Similarly, the reality is that there have been no successful domestic criminal 
prosecutions following the Pinochet model and Belgium’s recent experiment with full 
scale adoption of universal jurisdiction, has revealed problematic implications and 
distinct practical limitations on its use.151
There also appears to be significant limits on the potential effectiveness of 
international criminal processes.  The number of actual defendants that will appear before 
the place where the relevant violations occurred.  See supra notes 97, 99 and accompanying text. This lack 
of “connectivity” makes it critical that such foreign or extrinsic remedies focus on the narrow range of 
rights that enjoy universal acceptance and clear definitions susceptible to culturally neutral applications. 
See Donoho, Autonomy, Self-Governance and the Margin of Appreciation, supra note 22 at 450-66.
149Evidence about the potential spread of Filartiga style civil remedies to countries outside of the United 
States is somewhat murky.  There is at least some evidence that similar remedies are increasingly available 
in Europe in the form of reparations relating to criminal charges for extraterritorial human rights violations.  
See Van Schaak, supra note 90 at 144-47.  
150
 While many claims have been brought under the ATCA and TVPA, see Stephens, Individuals Enforcing 
International Law, supra note 18, only a modest number have resulted in judgments, mostly through 
default.  See Colliver, supra note 145 at 176 (citing 16 litigations resulting in judgments); Beth Stephens, 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain  “The Door is Still Ajar” for Human Rights Litigation, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533, 
534 (2004-2005)( “interest [in ATCA] far outstrips the actual results of the litigation: most ATS cases have 
been dismissed, only about two dozen cases have produced final judgments under the statute, and only one 
judgment has led to the collection of significant damages.”). See also Van Schaak, supra note 90 at 170; 
The requirements of jurisdiction essentially ensure that only a limited number of defendants -- those who 
travel to the United States-- will ever be brought to justice before U.S. courts. But see Colliver, supra note 
145 at 175 (Center for Justice and Accountability estimates that “several hundred” potential defendants 
currently reside in the United States).  Similarly, the potential for victims to ever in fact receive 
compensation is probably limited in that most defendants do not have significant assets.  See, e.g., George 
Stavis, Collecting Judgments in Human Rights Torts Cases—Flexibility for Non-Profit Litigators?, 31 
COLUM. H. RTS L. REV. 209, 214-16 (1999);  Colliver, supra note 145 at 179. Whether such suits provide 
any realistic deterrence against human rights violations remains correspondingly uncertain.  However, as 
many have pointed out, symbolism and intangible benefits to those limited number of victims who find 
their way to U.S. courts have real value if for no other reason than preventing the United States from 
becoming a safe haven for human rights abusers. Id. at 175-86.
151 See Steven Ratner, Belgium’s War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 A.J. INT’L L. 888, 891-94 (2003); 
Damien Vandermeersch, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 400, 404-09.
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such tribunals, if the ICTY’s experiences hold true, will be quite limited.  Like the ad hoc 
tribunals before it, the ICC will undoubtedly have difficulty apprehending future 
defendants and the subsidiary role of the ICC will limit its prosecutions to those where 
political conditions become favorable and domestic alternatives are impossible.152
Yet, despite these limits and other potential downsides, these developing 
alternatives should be lauded as potentially useful tools for enforcing human rights.  Each 
has, in essence, opened new frontiers in the quest for accountability.  Their importance 
does not lie in their current effectiveness but rather in their potential. The Filartiga and 
Pinochet approaches create potentially vibrant enforcement precedents by opening 
neutral domestic courts to victims of human rights violations occurring in places where 
local domestic redress is implausible or ineffective.  Widespread adoption of such 
remedies grounded in appropriately limited universal jurisdiction, especially among 
Western industrialized democracies where former human rights abusers are most likely to 
hide, would undoubtedly increase the potential that human rights victims will have access 
to neutral and effective judicial redress. 
B.  Insights for Reform:  Defining Appropriate Roles for International Institutions
What lessons for improving existing institutional frameworks may be drawn from 
the enforcement alternatives described above and the successes of the ECHR? Initially, it 
should be recognized that effective international human rights institutions are critical to 
world-wide realization of human rights.  Enforcement of human rights is ideally the job 
of domestic institutions where alleged violations occur.  We live, however, in a less than 
ideal world where effective domestic protection of individual rights will continue to be 
152 See generally Goldsmith, supra note 131.  
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often impossible.  In our imperfect world, international human rights bodies must and 
should play a vital role in enforcing rights and providing redress.153
The central characteristics of the enforcement alternatives described above 
provide insights into how a remodeled international system might more effectively fulfill 
these functions.  First and most importantly, the international community should make 
critical distinctions among rights with regard to enforceability.  Enforcement mechanisms 
regarding well defined, universally accepted rights for which international consensus 
over meaning exists will be more palatable and more readily accepted by governments.  
This is true not only for accused governments, but also for the international community 
generally, whose cooperation in creating meaningful incentives for compliance is vital.  
Mandatory sanctions through recourse to Security Council, or economic incentives linked 
to the WTO or IMF are, for example, far more likely to be accepted if limited to 
violations of universally understood and accepted rights.  
Similarly, this more nuanced approach to the enforceability of different categories 
of rights, if coupled with other institutional reforms, would significantly enhance the 
perceived legitimacy of international human rights institutions.  Attempts to 
authoritatively interpret and enforce specific applications of human rights that are subject 
to genuine cultural and political dispute inevitably raise concerns about over-reaching, 
lack of accountability and usurpation of local choice.  By focusing enforcement efforts 
(as opposed to non-binding promotional activity) on universally understood and relatively 
uncontroversial rights, concerns over institutional legitimacy are greatly ameliorated.  
153
 These international institutions also serve many valuable roles apart from enforcement.  The work of 
promoting rights awareness, exposing violations and responding to human rights crises is vital, and in 
critical ways, distinct from the work of authoritative enforcement.  
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Such distinctions among rights also lend themselves to important institutional 
reforms that could prompt governments to accept more authoritative enforcement 
mandates.  For example, the newly created ICC has enormous potential for engendering 
state respect for its authority that is typically missing with existing international human 
rights institutions.  Unlike most existing institutions, the ICC has been created with a 
clearly defined and circumscribed mandate and relatively narrow subject matter focus.  
Fears of over reaching or politicized decision making should be generally alleviated by 
the subsidiary nature of the Court’s jurisdiction.  While the ICC’s ultimate legitimacy and 
credibility will depend in part on whether it earns the respect of states incrementally over 
time, it is legally well situated to accomplish that goal.  The jurisdiction and mandate of 
existing institutions should be amended and clarified, or new institutions created, to 
reflect such distinctions.   
Such distinctions and limits on jurisdictional mandate will not only greatly 
improve the perceived legitimacy of human rights institutions; they may help mediate the
inherent tension between authoritative international enforcement and domestic 
democratic prerogatives.  I have argued elsewhere that the preservation of democratic 
values and our concerns over the democratic legitimacy of human rights decision making 
should shape how the international community approaches enforcement, particularly 
regarding the authority of international institutions.154  Indeed, in a perfect world 
populated by functioning democratic states with reasonable domestic institutional 
154
 Donoho, Democratic Legitimacy, supra note 10.
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safeguards, authoritative international remedies might reasonably be seen as 
inappropriate or counterproductive to democratic ideals.155
A key consideration in this regard once again involves jurisdictional constraint 
and distinctions among rights.  Enforcement focused on international consensus, 
universal jurisdiction and jus cogens, for example, sharply reduces concerns over the 
democratic authenticity and accountability of international decision making.  Violations 
subject to universal jurisdiction, like those that justify the prosecution of war crimes by 
the ICC, are not “foreign” or “external” to the world’s domestic legal systems and 
societies.  Rather, parallel legal norms exist within virtually all domestic legal systems 
and are deeply interwoven into the cultural and social fabric of every society.  A new 
name for an old wrong like “ethnic cleansing” doesn’t imply that the Bosnian Serbs had a 
different moral or legal code on that subject before international standards were 
developed by the ICTY.  The traditional norms and morals of virtually all societies, 
including Serbian, were violated by the atrocities committed in Bosnia.  
The creation of new or revised enforcement mandates, limited to rights over 
which true international consensus exists, should be coupled with other institutional 
reforms designed to promote credibility and respect.  Models for such institutions reforms 
should include the ECHR and ICC.  Although imperfect, both institutions possess 
155 Id. at 56-64. It must be acknowledged that the developing enforcement alternatives described above, if 
used without constraint, are not entirely consistent with this outlook.  For example, the most troubling 
objections to the Pinochet case have centered on the policy implications that arise when foreign courts 
indict former heads of states or other public officials, particularly when the originating jurisdiction has 
granted amnesties or is attempting other forms of national reconciliation.  Foreign litigation and 
prosecutions under these circumstances have the potential to usurp the originating state’s domestic 
processes and prerogatives. This potential for external interference with domestic democratic choice is 
similar to that created by authoritative international decision making.  In this sense, the Pinochet and 
Filartiga paradigms create variants on the inherent tension between international and domestic authority.  
Thus, these enforcement paradigms create new and distinct accountability issues since each involves 
decision makers external to the people, cultural and context in which the violations took place.
Donoho Final Draft 4-19-06
55
generally credible and neutral procedures for selecting judges or “experts,” professional 
and regularized rules of evidence and procedures, and plausibly sufficient staffs and 
budgets.
Finally, the reforms described above must be accompanied by efforts to link 
resulting international decisions to practical economic and political consequences that 
create practical incentives for voluntary compliance.  Such incentives, crucial to the 
success of the ECHR, are only likely to develop, however, with regard to decisions 
limited to enforcement of a fairly narrow range of universal rights over which true 
concerns exists.
Conclusion
Enforcement remains the weakest component of the international human rights 
system.  Designed around the implausible premise of voluntary state compliance, existing 
international institutions outside of Europe currently lack the capacity to meaningfully 
enforce human rights in a world characterized by conflict and diversity.  Already hobbled 
by institutional weaknesses, existing human rights bodies have failed to develop 
incrementally their legitimacy and earn the respect of governments by developing a 
nuanced approach to enforcement that recognizes distinctions among rights regarding 
enforceability.  Lessons for reform should be drawn in this regard from the ECHR and 
developing enforcement alternatives which focus on individual accountability for a fairly 
narrow range of rights over which international consensus exists.
